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Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum

The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in
Patent Law
abstract. The ambiguity of claim language is generally considered to be the most
important problem in patent law today. Linguistic ambiguity is believed to cause tremendous
uncertainty about patent rights. Scholars and judges have accordingly devoted enormous
attention to developing better linguistic tools to help courts understand patent claims.
In this Article, we explain why this diagnosis is fundamentally wrong. Claims are not often
ambiguous, and linguistic ambiguity is not a major cause of the uncertainty in patent law today.
We shall explain what really causes the uncertainty in patent rights, how the erroneous diagnosis
of linguistic ambiguity has led the literature off track, and what will get us back on track to
solving the uncertainty problem.
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the interpretation-construction distinction in patent law

introduction
The uncertainty over how courts will apply patent claims in adjudicating
infringement is a real and very substantial problem in patent law today. A large
literature addresses this problem.1 The common premise of this literature is
that the uncertainty arises because claim language is itself uncertain,2 and the
proposals for reform accordingly focus on linguistic solutions.3 For example,
judges and scholars debate whether the best source of linguistic meaning is
dictionary definitions,4 or the context provided by the whole patent document,5

1.

2.

3.

4.

See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8-11 (2008); Gretchen Ann Bender,
Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim
Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175 (2001); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743
(2009); Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711 (2010); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); Craig
Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000); David L.
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1163-70 (2004).
See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Claims
cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face.”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56
(“We want to highlight . . . the issuance of vague claims.”); Dan L. Burk, Dynamic Claim
Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 107, 112 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013) (“Due to the inherent ambiguity of language, the boundary remains
necessarily indeterminate . . . .”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1745 (arguing that claim
language may be “inherently indeterminate”); Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a
Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP THEORY 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that “the limitations of language”
cause uncertainty); Menell et al., supra note 1, at 716 (“If nothing else, the past two decades
revealed the inherent difficulties of using language to define the boundaries of abstract and
intangible rights.”); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 637-38 (2010) (attributing the problem to “the inherent indeterminacy of
language”).
See, e.g., AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he language
of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation.”); Russell B.
Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in
Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1 (2002); Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger,
The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 829, 886-87 (2005); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 61, 63 (2006).
See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(favoring dictionaries).
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or testimony from expert witnesses.6 A closely related debate is institutional:
whether appellate judges, trial judges, or juries are best equipped to implement
a particular linguistic solution and discern linguistic meaning.7 At the
pessimistic extreme, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that claim language is
so innately indeterminate that it should be abolished altogether.8 Although the
proposed solutions vary widely, there is wide agreement that the source of the
difficulty is that claim language is vague or ambiguous.9 We will call this the
“linguistic indeterminacy thesis.”
This Article challenges the widely shared premise. The uncertainty in how
courts will apply claims does not characteristically arise because of uncertainty
regarding linguistic meaning. There may be some occasional cases in which
linguistic ambiguity (where language has more than one sense) produces
underdeterminacy of legal outcomes, and more cases in which vagueness
(where language has borderline cases) causes uncertainty; but we argue that
uncertainty in claim application most typically arises because judges have core
policy disagreements about the underlying goals of claim construction. In
order to explicate and distinguish between these different sources of
uncertainty, we will draw upon what has been called the “interpretationconstruction distinction” in recent constitutional theory.10
Stated simply, modern constitutional theory draws a distinction between
determining the linguistic meaning of a text (“interpretation”), and giving

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
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See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(favoring the specification); Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to
Escalating Reliance on Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 181, 189-90 (2003) (criticizing the Telegenix court’s “process of considering
dictionaries before specifications”).
Nard, supra note 1, at 66, 69 (favoring expert testimony).
Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“The trial court is best situated to gauge the relevance and need for additional
evidence to explicate claim terms.”), with Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[C]laim construction, as a form of document
construction, is solely a question of law subject to de novo review.” (citations omitted)).
Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1784-86.
See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. But see Thomas W. Krause & Heather F.
Auyang, What Close Cases and Reversals Reveal About Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit,
12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 605 (2013) (arguing that disagreements arise
because of policy differences among judges); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal,
and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2007) (arguing
that disagreements arise because of “the particular cognitive processes by which legal
observers reach legal interpretations”).
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95
(2010).
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legal effect to that text (“construction”).11 To take an example, there is some
uncertainty in constitutional law about the contours of the state action doctrine
as applied to the First Amendment.12 But the source of this uncertainty is not
linguistic indeterminacy, and the answer to the doctrinal problem cannot be
found in better evidence about linguistic practices in the late eighteenth
century. The linguistic meaning of the First Amendment’s state action
requirement—that “Congress” is bound—is clear. The cause of the uncertainty
is not that people do not know what “Congress” means as a matter of
semantics, but that strictly limiting the First Amendment to congressional
action—and allowing other government actors to establish religions and censor
speech—would result in outcomes that seem unwise or unjust. Courts react to
this problem by engaging in constitutional construction: the courts craft
constitutional doctrine with a broader scope of application for the First
Amendment. Uncertainty about this doctrine results when judges disagree on
how much broader the scope should be in light of the underlying reasons of
policy and principle. This normative dispute over legal effect is very different
from a dispute about the semantic meaning of the word “Congress.”
The interpretation-construction distinction does not tell us how to resolve
these disputes over legal effect. Rather, the payoff of drawing the distinction is
antecedent: it tells us which issues are problems of linguistic meaning, and
which issues are problems of legal effect. This is important because the two
types of problems call for different solutions. More and better linguistic
information (such as more accurate definitions or data about usage) can solve
problems of linguistic uncertainty and hence result in more accurate
interpretations. Linguistics cannot resolve policy debates and thus cannot
resolve issues of construction. The limits of linguistics are especially apparent
when the linguistic meaning of a claim underdetermines the claim’s legal

11.

12.

See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 118-30 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5-9 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (discussing the
interpretation-construction distinction in constitutional law). Although the interpretationconstruction distinction has recently become prominent in constitutional theory, it has been
used in a variety of legal contexts. See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 939-40 (1967).
Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (holding that the First Amendment
applies to a privately owned company town), with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570
(1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not apply to a privately owned shopping
mall). See generally Frederick F. Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in
First Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1977) (discussing the lines of
disagreement in this area).
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effect. We shall call the space where linguistic information underdetermines
legal effect the “construction zone.”
The confusion between interpretation and construction—and the use of the
wrong tools because of a misdiagnosis of the problem—is endemic in patent
law. As mentioned above, the premise of the literature has been that the
problems of claim construction stem from linguistic uncertainty. The same is
true of the case law. The leading modern case on analyzing patent claims (we
will use “analysis” to denote an activity that encompasses both interpretation
and construction) is Phillips v. AWH Corp.,13 which deals with whether a patent
claim to “steel baffles” covered non-bullet-deflecting steel baffles. Reflecting
the consensus that the problem with claims is their linguistic indeterminacy,
the opinion features an extended discussion of the role of dictionaries and
other sources in determining linguistic meaning.14 But this was a fool’s errand.
Nobody in Phillips—none of the litigants, and none of the judges in the
majority or the two dissents—disputed the linguistic meaning of “steel baffle”
or that this linguistic meaning covered a non-bullet-deflecting baffle.15 The
dispute in Phillips was over the wisdom of giving legal effect to this linguistic
meaning, because the patentee’s stated purpose for the invention was a bulletresistant reinforced wall, while the accused product did not deflect bullets.16
Giving legal effect to the semantic meaning would thus arguably extend the
monopoly scope of the patent to something that the patentee had not really
invented. What Phillips really represents is a conflict about the underlying goal
of claim construction: is it to give effect to the linguistic meaning of text, or is
it to tailor patent scope to the real invention? As we will explain, these two
goals are fundamentally different, and the inquiry becomes incoherent—and
uncertain—when judges oscillate between them.
In this Article, we are not taking a position on the question whether
allowing patentees a broader monopoly than what they had invented or
foreseen is good patent policy; that is a question for another day. Our point is
that the interpretation-construction distinction provides a conceptual tool that
allows scholars, lawyers, and judges to identify this policy disagreement as the
true cause of disputes. Because most disputes over claim “meaning” are actually
normative disputes over policy issues, a solution to the claim construction

13.
14.
15.
16.

536

415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id. at 1312-19 (considering the claim structure, the specification, the prosecution history,
dictionaries, and expert testimony).
Cf. id. at 1310 (noting the parties’ stipulation to the ordinary meaning of “baffle”).
See id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The abstract refers to
‘bullet deflecting . . . baffles.’ Only angled baffles can deflect. It then mentions ‘internal
baffles at angles for deflecting bullets.’ That could not be clearer.” (alteration in original)).
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debate cannot be found in better linguistic sources. Efforts at reform should
focus instead on resolving the policy disagreement among judges.
Here is a road map. Part I provides background on patent claims and
describes the conventional debate about problems in claim analysis, which
attributes uncertainty to textual defects. Part II then begins by laying out a
general theory for analyzing legal texts, in particular distinguishing between
the interpretation of linguistic meaning and the construction of legal effect. We
then lay out the kinds of problems that are generally addressed through
interpretation, and the kinds of problems that generally fall under the rubric of
construction. We will also distinguish between two kinds of construction. At a
high level, courts engage in construction by determining whether to follow the
linguistic meaning of text or to follow something else in making their
decisions. At a lower level, if a court chooses to follow the linguistic meaning of
text, it must decide how to fill in the gaps when the linguistic meaning does
not fully answer a legal dispute (i.e., the dispute falls within the construction
zone). As we will explain, both types of construction involve normative policy
choices, and both are qualitatively different from the type of linguistic inquiry
that occurs during interpretation.
Parts III to V then apply this framework to patent law. We illustrate
through exemplar cases our argument that claim analysis debates are mainly
about construction: judges do not disagree about the linguistic meaning, but
they do disagree about whether to construe claims according to the linguistic
meaning or according to the patentee’s actual inventive idea. The two
standards are different, and they represent different theories of construction.
The policy dispute between them is the true cause of the uncertainty in patent
law today.
Part VI considers the implications of our analysis. Contrary to what
scholars and courts have assumed (or professed to assume), it is simply not
true that claim analysis disputes arise primarily because claim text is
linguistically ambiguous. Better linguistic tools—which patent scholars and
judges have felled many trees proposing and debating—will therefore not help
resolve the uncertainty in claim analysis. Rather, the primary cause of
uncertainty in patent rights is that judges disagree over the better theory of
construction, namely, whether courts should award patent scope according to
the linguistic meaning of the claim text or according to the real invention. We
then explain how the interpretation-construction distinction provides a
conceptual framework to evaluate proposed solutions to the problem, one in
which policy proposals can be brought forward and evaluated as policy
proposals. We argue that this is greatly superior to the conceptual strictures of
the existing debate, where all proposals for reform (even those that are really
policy prescriptions) are framed and evaluated as solutions to linguistic
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uncertainty. By providing a conceptual tool that exposes the misguided
premises of the existing debate and making clear the true causes of uncertainty
in patent law, as well as by providing a better conceptual framework to evaluate
proposals for reform, the interpretation-construction distinction lays the
foundation for a more productive discourse about claim analysis.
i. the linguistic indeterminacy theory of patent law
In this Part, we describe the conventional terms of debate over claim
meaning, where the problem is presented as one involving linguistic
interpretation. Before describing the debate over patent claims, however, it is
useful to provide a brief background on what “claims” are, and how they relate
to the rest of the patent document.
A. Background on Patents
A United States Patent is a complex document, but its two most important
components are the written description of the invention (commonly called the
“specification”) and the claims.17 Both the specification and the claims are
drafted by the patentee, and they both purport to describe the invention being
patented. Though this might seem redundant at first blush, the specification
and the claims in fact perform very different functions, and look quite different
in practice.18
The specification provides a detailed technical disclosure of the invention,
so that others can make and use it.19 This requires considerable detail, so that
the invention can be built from the ground up. For example, in the
specification of their patent on the airplane, the Wright brothers described
their pioneering glider down to the springs, ropes, cloth, and wood that it

17.

18.

19.
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Strictly speaking, the specification includes both the written description and the claims. In
common parlance, however, “specification” is used to refer only to the written description
component of a patent. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 40 (2d ed. 2011). We will
follow the common usage in this Article.
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“‘[T]he two standards,
while complementary, approach a similar problem from different directions.’” (quoting
Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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used.20 These details are needed so that someone reading the patent could later
(after the patent expires) build an airplane based on their example.21
But, obviously, it is not particularly important that an airplane use a
particular type of spring. The essence of an airplane is simply that it has wings
and flies. It would eviscerate patent incentives if another person could take the
Wright brothers’ airplane, change a few springs, and thereby escape
infringement liability. In other words, it is important for patent law to
encourage the Wright brothers to disclose lots of technical detail to allow later
replication of the invention, but it would be unwise to confine the legal scope
of the monopoly right by requiring those details to be slavishly replicated for
infringement.22
To solve this problem, patent law developed “claims,” which are onesentence descriptions of the invention that demarcate the monopoly right. By
separating claims from the specification, patent law allows different functions
to be fulfilled. In the specification, the Wright brothers can describe their
airplane in tremendous detail. But in defining their patent’s legal scope, they
are permitted to claim the essential inventive features.23 A simplified claim to
the airplane might thus read:
My invention is a flying machine that has
(1) wings; and,
(2) a rudder.24
It is important to understand that the claim allows the patentee to cover
much more than replication of the embodiment that is described in the
specification. The Wright brothers’ specification described a single wooden
glider: it barely flew, it had no engine, and it used cloth wings. But the
inventive idea being claimed in our example above—an airplane with wings

20.
21.

22.

23.
24.

See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 col. 2 ll. 103-06 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (wood frame); id. col. 1 ll.
108-11 (cloth-covered wings); id. col. 3 ll. 57-60 (rope pulleys); id. col. 8 ll. 111-19 (springs).
See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting the
argument that “the specification need only disclose those aspects of the claimed invention
that do not exist in the prior art”).
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (stating that a
rule requiring slavish replication would “convert the protection of the patent grant into a
hollow and useless thing”).
See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 10:1.1 (6th ed.
2008) (“The claims should cover the inventor’s concept.”).
This is a highly simplified version of the key claim (claim 7) from the Wright brothers’
patent. See ’393 Patent cols. 11-12 ll. 62-74. The Wright brothers’ claim also included a
requirement that the rudder be directed in the same direction as the roll of the airplane. Id.
cols. 11-12 ll. 69-74.
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and a rudder—covers all airplanes, including a future jet. It is bedrock patent
law that anything that is described by a claim infringes the patent, even if it
otherwise looks very different from the specification embodiment.25 Although a
modern 747 looks very different from the Wright brothers’ glider (the
specification embodiment), it still has wings and a rudder, and thus it would
infringe a patent with a claim written in the manner of our example.
In sum, the claim and the specification both describe the invention, but
they serve different roles. For legal purposes, it is the claim that defines patent
scope.26
B. The Problem of Claim Meaning
As the Section above explains, claim scope equals patent scope,27 which
makes claims very important. It is equally axiomatic that claim scope is defined
by the text of the claim.28 It is generally regarded as very important that patent
scope be entirely independent of the policy judgment of individual judges.29 It
is the worst form of judicial activism, according to the Federal Circuit, for a
judge to first decide whether an accused product ought be found to infringe
and then twist claim text to reach that desired result.30 In short, claim analysis
is supposed to be a process where judges first neutrally interpret the text and
then allow the infringement chips to fall where they may.
Yet despite these routine pronouncements by courts that they are rigidly
adhering to claim text, it still seems that claim scope is wildly unpredictable. If
one looks to the Federal Circuit, that court can apparently read the same text to

25.
26.
27.

28.
29.

30.
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ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 27 (5th ed. 2011).
See Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1942) (“[I]t is these
claims, not the specifications, that afford the measure of the grant to the patentee.”).
There is a narrow exception to this rule, known as the “doctrine of equivalents,” that allows
a court to deem an unclaimed product to be infringing if the difference is “insubstantial.”
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 955, 958 (2007).
AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“No matter how
great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework claims. They only
interpret them.”); see also Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the
normally terse claim language.”).
SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (stating
that such a procedure makes patent protection “a matter of judicial whim”).
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reach almost any outcome. The court has held that the word “a” means “one or
more,”31 and it has also held that it means “only one.”32 It has held the word
“plurality” to mean “more than one,”33 and it has also held the word to mean
“one.”34 It has held that using the word “normal” limits a claim to technology
in common use at the time of patent filing,35 while using the word “regular”
does not.36 The list of inconsistencies and contradictions goes on.
What observers take from these cases is that, because the judges purport to
be applying the text but are coming to wildly disparate results, the text must be
defective and its meaning is nearly always unclear.37 In short, courts and
commentators subscribe to the linguistic indeterminacy thesis that the
indeterminacy of claim language is what causes the disparate results and the ex
ante uncertainty regarding patent rights. Proceeding from this predicate
diagnosis, they then debate the merits of a wide variety of linguistic tools as
solutions to legal uncertainty.38 For example, one line of case law argues that
ambiguous claim text should be clarified by looking to unbiased third-party
sources such as dictionaries and encyclopedias.39 Another line of case law
argues that ambiguous text should be clarified by looking to the patentee’s own
usage in the patent specification.40 Craig Allen Nard argues that ambiguous
text should be clarified by looking to expert testimony about how a person in

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.

38.

39.
40.

Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Harari v. Lee, 656 F.3d 1331, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Claims
cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum
Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 51 (2005) (arguing that it is “folly” to assume
“that the text of a patent claim, or any other text, has some readily discernible ‘plain’ or
‘ordinary’ meaning”).
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam)
(ordering rehearing en banc and directing the parties to discuss, among other things,
whether “the public notice function of patent claims [is] better served by referencing
primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a
claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification”).
See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“The best source for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it arose
. . . .”).
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the field would understand the claim terms.41 Dan Burk and Peter Lee have
each argued for a process of “dynamic” interpretation where courts would
exploit the ambiguity of language to reach socially beneficial outcomes while
purporting to maintain fidelity to text.42 Oskar Liivak argues that claims must
be interpreted according to the invention, which he defines as “the set of
embodiments conceived and disclosed by the inventor in enough detail that
they can be reduced to practice.”43 Most extremely, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley
argue that claim text is so innately defective that it cannot be redeemed and
that the claiming requirement should therefore be abolished.44 Under this
proposal, patent scope would instead be directly determined by courts
according to what they perceive to be the patentee’s invention.45
A closely related literature focuses on the institutional allocation of
responsibility. If the problem is that claim language is unclear, then who is best
equipped to implement a chosen linguistic cure? The Supreme Court in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. held claim analysis to be a pure question
of law,46 implicitly allocating the task to appellate judges on the rationale that
they are especially skilled in analyzing written documents.47 Patent scholars
and judges have spilled much ink advocating a wide variety of alternatives,
ranging from allocating claim analysis to district judges,48 to allocating it to

41.
42.

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
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Nard, supra note 1.
Burk, supra note 2, at 118-19 (arguing that a decision-maker should “actively and openly
contemplate[] and assess[] the potential outcomes from different readings of the text” while
asserting that “[t]he text remains central to this approach”); Lee, supra note 2, at 105.
Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 5
(2012).
Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1784-85.
Id. Unlike Liivak, who conceptualizes the invention as a set of tangible embodiments, Burk
and Lemley conceptualize the invention in functional terms as the optimal scope of the
patent. See id. at 1762; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation
Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 127-29 (2005)
(arguing for courts to manipulate claim analysis methodology to achieve a socially beneficial
degree of patent scope).
517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (holding that claim analysis is to be treated as “purely legal” and
“under the authority of the single appeals court”).
Id. at 388-89.
See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Michel, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing for deference to trial
courts); Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94
VA. L. REV. 1165, 1186-88 (2008); see also J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal
Deference: An Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150360 (manuscript at 69)
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specialized trial courts,49 to allocating it to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO),50 to allocating it to juries.51 Invariably, the argument is that the
alternative decision-maker would be in some way better able to understand
claim language compared to appellate judges.
Although the proposed solutions (and the proposed actors to implement
the solutions) differ widely, they all share one underlying premise: that the
root cause of the problem is linguistic uncertainty. That is, the conflict over the
proper approach to claim analysis is believed to arise only because the text itself
is linguistically ambiguous or vague in the first place.52 We challenge this
premise. As we shall discuss, the cause of uncertainty in claim analysis is
typically not a linguistic defect, but rather normative disagreement. In order to
distinguish these two types of uncertainty more carefully, we will draw upon
the “interpretation-construction distinction,” a concept in legal theory that has
been widely discussed outside of the patent law literature.
ii. the interpretation-construction distinction
In this Part, we first provide an introduction to the interpretationconstruction distinction. Our primary example will be drawn from
constitutional law, where the interpretation-construction distinction has had
the greatest contemporary influence. Much like the current argument in patent
law, a once-common argument in constitutional law claimed that the
constitutional text was frequently indeterminate. As Larry Simon put it,
“[w]hile some of the provisions in the Constitution have relatively

49.
50.

51.

52.

(arguing for “something approaching” de novo appellate review of documentary sources,
but a more deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review for factual predicates).
Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
877 (2002).
John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 143-48 (2000) (arguing that courts should refer
claim analysis questions to the PTO); see also Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 3, at 886-87
(arguing that the PTO “is well suited to deploy its power over patent examination procedure
to render dictionary selection far more predictable”).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Mayer, C.J., concurring) (arguing that claim analysis should be considered a jury
question), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1760 (“The process of claim construction itself
presumes that the words of the claims are insufficiently precise to delineate those
boundaries.”); see also AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim
interpretation.”).
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unambiguous, specific, and noncontroversial meanings, the language of a great
many is so vague, ambiguous, and open-textured that they might be
understood to mean almost anything.”53 For example, how cruel and unusual is
so cruel and unusual that it violates the Eighth Amendment? This then led to
the belief that textualism and originalism were unworkable, and that original
meaning should have little role in constitutional analysis.54
What the interpretation-construction distinction has exposed is a logical
fallacy in the argument: the mere fact that the text does not fully dictate legal
outcomes does not mean that it tells us nothing. Text can have a linguistic
meaning even when legal outcomes are not fully determined: we know the
linguistic meaning of “cruelty”—in the sense of it being a comprehensible
concept—even when there are borderline cases of cruelty or the precise line
between cruel and not is difficult to discern.
As a result of this insight, there is now a wide consensus that original
meaning has an important role to play in constitutional analysis, albeit not a
fully determinative role.55 We believe that the interpretation-construction
distinction can likewise inform the debate in patent law. We begin by
explaining the concept itself.
A. A Simple Example
Consider the first word of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution: “Congress.” In one sense, every reader of this Article should
understand what this word means—it refers to the legislative organ of the
federal government. But, in another sense, it is also entirely common as a
figure of lawyerly speech to say that the First Amendment “means” that

53.
54.

55.
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Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 603 (1985).
See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Are We All Living Constitutionalists Now?, in ROBERT W.
BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 165, 172-75
(2011); Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in BENNETT &
SOLUM, supra, at 78, 85-87; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 207-08 (1980); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 90 (1989); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189,
1196 (1987).
Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 166
(2008) (“By far the dominant position [today] is to regard original meaning as always
relevant to constitutional interpretation, albeit only as a factor to be considered alongside
other factors.”).
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executive branch officials cannot prosecute political dissidents for their views,56
and that district courts cannot issue injunctions against truthful speech.57 The
First Amendment means these things because the Supreme Court has told us
so. At the same time, however, executive branch officials and federal courts are
obviously not the legislative organ of the federal government. Because the First
Amendment’s semantic content is limited by the word “Congress,” its
linguistic meaning does not extend to violations of free speech by any
government institution other than the Congress of the United States.
The contradiction between these two meanings of “Congress” causes
lawyers to engage in all sorts of mental gymnastics. For example, we start to
say that the word “Congress” is ambiguous, or that it has no meaning, or that
the Framers must really have intended for the First Amendment to cover all
branches of government.58 Jack Balkin has argued that “Congress” is a
synecdoche—a literary device in which the part can refer to the whole—
primarily because a contrary interpretation would lead to a parade of horrible
outcomes.59 Clear thinking on the subject becomes impossible, as we twist the
word “Congress” into pretzels.

56.

57.
58.

59.

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (“[T]he law is settled that as a general matter
the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to
retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.” (citing Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998))).
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding an injunction against the
publication of classified material to be impermissible).
See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1156
(1986) (noting that many lawyers react to the problem by responding “that ‘Congress’ was
an unaccountable slip of the pen by the Founding Fathers, and that no meaning could be
attached to it”); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment’s First
Word, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 602 (2013) (noting that people find an argument that the First
Amendment is limited to congressional action to be “frightening” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 204-05 (2011). If Balkin’s argument is purely about
linguistic meaning, it seems implausible. The use of synecdoche or similar literary devices in
a legal text is an invitation to confusion and misunderstanding; for this reason, the drafters
of the Constitution would likely have avoided it. Balkin adduces no direct evidence that
“Congress” meant “all three branches of the national government,” and we know of no such
evidence. There is no other clear instance of synecdoche in the constitutional text, and the
other occurrences of the word “Congress” seem clearly to refer to the institution created by
the Constitution, consisting of the House and the Senate. In this Article, we do not consider
alternative theories that would extend First Amendment limits to actors other than
Congress. Cf. Hemel, supra note 58, at 604 (arguing that executive action abridging free
speech would violate the Due Process clause). Even if there were no textualist route to the
application of the freedom of speech to executive or judicial action, the extension could
occur through constitutional construction. Our point here is only that one cannot reach that
result through interpretation of the word “Congress.”
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At its core, the payoff of the interpretation-construction distinction is to
allow lawyers to think clearly about this situation. Legal analysis of the word
“Congress” is a two-step process. At the first step, which we call
“interpretation,” a legal analyst recognizes that the word “Congress”
linguistically refers to the legislative organ of the federal government—this is
the word’s linguistic meaning. At the second step, which we call “construction,”
the analyst recognizes that the legal scope of the First Amendment covers all
government. By conceptually distinguishing between the linguistic meaning
and the legal meaning, we no longer need to twist “Congress” into pretzels.
Our point here is conceptual: We express no opinion about whether it is
wise or legitimate for courts to construe “Congress” differently from its
linguistic meaning. Our point is that the two types of “meaning” are different,
and it is crucial to recognize this difference. Without the interpretationconstruction distinction, legal analysis has a tendency to become a shouting
match: one side says “Congress” means the legislative organ of the federal
government by citing a dictionary;60 the other side argues that “Congress”
means all government by citing all the horrible results that would ensue from a
contrary definition.61 Neither side realizes they are talking past the other with
entirely different modes of argumentation. Scholarly and judicial debate
becomes unproductive and goes in circles when such cross-talk occurs.
In the Sections below, we explain each step of the two-step process.
B. Interpretation
1. What Is Interpretation?
Interpretation, as we have defined it (other labels could be used), is the
process of discerning the linguistic meaning of a text using linguistic tools.62 As
a working definition, the linguistic meaning of a text is the set of ideas and
concepts that are communicated by the language to a member of the intended

60.

61.

62.
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E.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209,
1266 (2010) (stating that “[a]s a matter of grammar and logic, the President . . . cannot
violate” the First Amendment).
E.g., BALKIN, supra note 59, at 204. Balkin does not rely solely on the consequences of
limiting the First Amendment to Congress; he also argues that this result is consistent with
the purpose of the text. David Strauss also addresses the question of whether the First
Amendment is limited to Congress. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1996) (arguing that “no one suggests that the
First Amendment applies only to Congress”).
For a more complete account of “interpretation,” see Solum, supra note 10, at 100-02.
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audience. This definition captures what is going on in our prior example—a
member of the general public (the audience for the Constitution) would most
likely understand “Congress” to semantically refer to the federal legislative
body, rendering this the correct interpretation.
Although people tend to notice the activity of interpretation only when the
language is difficult to understand in some way (e.g., if it is a foreign
language), it is actually an activity that occurs literally all the time when
reading or listening: the reader is interpreting the words of this Article right
now. Most of the time, interpretation occurs so intuitively that it is not noticed,
but this is because our background education makes it simple. A foreigner who
has no education in English would not find this Article easy to understand, and
he would require an interpreter or dictionary to discern the linguistic meaning.
An important feature of the linguistic meaning is that it is factual. The ideas
and concepts that the intended audience will comprehend from a certain text is
simply a fact about the world: the linguistic meaning is beyond the control of,
and thus not dependent upon, the normative preferences of a third-party
interpreter such as a judge. The linguistic meaning of “Congress” in the First
Amendment is that it refers to the legislative organ of the federal government.
A particular judge might very well wish that the First Amendment applied to
other government bodies on policy grounds—and that judge might construe the
First Amendment to cover all government—but such normative considerations
are not part of the linguistic meaning.
The objectivity of interpretation is important because there is a classic
counterargument, often associated with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
movement,63 that legal texts have no objective meanings—legal texts mean
whatever judges say they mean.64 Such indeterminacy arguments are common
in the patent literature.65 We think this argument is obviously wrong.66 The

63.
64.

65.

66.

See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 462, 462-70 (1987).
Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES AND
PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 133, 139 (1908) (“We are under a Constitution, but the
Constitution is what the judges say it is . . . .”).
See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 112-18 (“Originalist theories . . . promise a determined
meaning that they cannot deliver.”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 31-32 (arguing that
there may be “no such thing” as an ordinary meaning to claim text); Lee, supra note 2, at 114
(arguing against a view that “presumes that language is determinate”); Liivak, supra note 43,
at 40 (arguing that “[c]laim interpretation is now a meaningless exercise” because it relies
on bare text).
See Solum, supra note 63; cf. ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME: HOW JUDGES
AND LAWYERS MAKE THE LAW, at xv (2008) (“The modern understanding of language and
culture shows us that meaning is not something that texts possess. It is something that
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linguistic meanings of legal texts are not radically indeterminate, because
linguistic communication works. Indeed, the claim that law is indeterminate
could not be made coherently if linguistic communication were impossible
(because the CLS authors must themselves make the claim using language).67
At the same time, we should acknowledge that indeterminacy arguments have
an important surface appeal: familiar legal terms such as “freedom of speech”
are quite open-ended in their legal scope.68 Such open-endedness or vagueness,
however, only proves that the linguistic meaning is incomplete in specifying
legal outcomes, not that the linguistic meaning is non-existent. The essence of
the interpretation-construction distinction is to place under the rubric of
interpretation the issue of discerning the linguistic meaning, and then to
address the remaining issues—including but not limited to filling the gap when
the linguistic meaning underspecifies the legal outcome—under the rubric of
construction. We make no claim that the linguistic meaning by itself can
answer all the legal questions.69
With this understanding, in this Section we will explore problem-types in
which interpretation is required and how linguistic tools can overcome these
problems. To begin, we should emphasize that the existence of an
interpretative problem does not prove that the text is indeterminate. The
existence of an interpretative problem, such as the text being written in a
foreign language, simply calls for interpretation to resolve the problem. It is
only if interpretation fails to yield an answer that uncertainty results. Our
examples thus also help us illustrate how interpretation works in various
settings to prevent uncertainty from developing.

67.
68.

69.
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interpreters produce.”); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 45 (1987)
(“While most CLS writers have undoubtedly emphasized the inherent ambiguity of
language . . . the more coherent CLS position has moved away from the tendency . . . to
focus on the limitlessness of interpretations of each verbal command.”).
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989).
See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (2012) (claiming
that language is highly manipulable in many situations, outside of precise rules such as the
requirement that presidents be thirty-five years old).
Another way of saying this is that a distinction can be drawn between total indeterminacy
and partial underdeterminacy. The idea that language underdetermines applications to
particular cases is a modest one: underdeterminacy occurs so long as there are borderline
cases (or vagueness). The idea that language is utterly indeterminate, however, is much
more radical. See Solum, supra note 63, at 473.
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2. The Problem of Apparent Ambiguity
A problem familiar to lawyers is the problem of apparent ambiguity, where
a text at first blush appears susceptible to more than one interpretation. We say
“apparent” ambiguity because, properly interpreted, a particular text almost
always has only one correct linguistic meaning, though that correct meaning
may be difficult to discern. The process of interpretation is to resolve the
apparent ambiguity and discern what the correct meaning is.
As an initial matter, it is important here to distinguish ambiguity from
vagueness. Although the two words are often used interchangeably in legal
conversation, they have more precise meanings in the philosophy of language.
A word or phrase is ambiguous if it has more than one sense. For example, the
word “table” by itself is ambiguous. It can either refer to a physical apparatus
that is often paired with chairs, or it can refer to a spreadsheet such as one in
Microsoft Excel. In contrast, a word or phrase is vague if it has fuzzy
boundaries. For example, the word “tall” is vague, because it has borderline
cases. If someone asked you, “Is Mr. Smith tall?,” it would be difficult to
answer the question even if you knew that Mr. Smith’s height was five feet and
eleven inches because the concept of tallness is fuzzy and five feet and eleven
inches is a borderline case. But the word “tall” is not ambiguous, because we
know that the attribute in question is Mr. Smith’s height (and not, for
example, his weight). To jump ahead, apparent ambiguity can (generally) be
resolved with interpretation; usually, context tells us which of the two (or
more) senses captures the linguistic meaning. Vagueness (or open texture)
cannot be eliminated in this way and hence requires construction.
Let us begin by showing how apparent ambiguities can both arise in texts
and be resolved through interpretation. An example from patent law is Merrill
v. Yeomans.70 The patentee in Merrill had invented a process for producing a
new type of hydrocarbon oil. He then claimed “the above-described new
manufacture of the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils.”71 The question in the
case was whether this claim referred to the new process of making hydrocarbon
oils (if “manufacture” meant “process of making”) or to the new hydrocarbon
oil product (if “manufacture” meant “thing produced”). This distinction
mattered because the defendants were using the hydrocarbon oil product but
not the manufacturing process. And because the word “manufacture” in

70.
71.

94 U.S. 568 (1876). Merrill is foundational in establishing that the patent claim defines the
invention. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 801.
Merrill, 94 U.S. at 570.
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isolation can denote either a process or a product, the claim was linguistically
ambiguous.
Although the claim was linguistically ambiguous, it is crucial to understand
that this ambiguity could be—and, in fact, was—resolved using interpretive
tools. The relevant tool here is to look to context, including the remainder of
the text. The full claim reads:
I claim the above-described new manufacture of the deodorized heavy
hydrocarbon oils, suitable for lubricating and other purposes, free from
the characteristic odors of hydrocarbon oils, and having a slight smell
like fatty oil, from hydrocarbon oils, by treating them substantially as is
hereinbefore described.72
Once read in context, it becomes quite clear that the word “manufacture” in
the claim refers to a process and not a product. A sentence that read, “I claim
the above described new manufacture of the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon
oils . . . from [untreated] hydrocarbon oils, by treating them substantially as is
hereinbefore described,” would make no grammatical sense if “manufacture”
was being used to denote a product. By considering the surrounding context
and applying some ordinary rules of grammar, we can arrive at the correct
linguistic meaning. The Supreme Court in Merrill in fact used this reasoning to
arrive at the same conclusion.73
We take two points from this example. First, apparent ambiguities can
often arise in patent claims and other legal texts. Second, however, such
ambiguities can be resolved if we have the right contextual evidence available—
and if the ambiguity is resolved with sufficient ease, it will not cause
uncertainty. This second point has a corollary: if the contextual evidence is not
available, then we may not be able to resolve the apparent ambiguity.
The fact that proper interpretation depends on the availability of evidence
does not change its factual nature. The resolution of factual questions generally
depends on the availability of evidence. For example, whether criminal
defendant X shot victim Y is an objective factual question—there is clearly a
right answer in theory—but whether a court will be able to discern the correct
answer depends on the availability of evidence. Similarly, ambiguity can cause
uncertainty if there is insufficient evidence, but the uncertainty and
disagreement will disappear if we have enough evidence. Our point here is not
that resolving ambiguities is always easy—the type and quantity of contextual
evidence that is needed will vary depending on the circumstances, as will the

72.
73.
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 571.
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feasibility and ease of collecting such evidence—but that the exercise is
objective. Even difficult cases have a correct theoretical answer, which sufficient
evidence will yield.
We should add one qualification to this: there are special situations where
there is no single correct answer to an interpretative question. For example, if
someone with a severe mental disorder writes something that is pure gibberish,
then there is no idea that is conveyed to the audience and no linguistic
meaning. Alternatively, in literary works, authors sometimes seek to convey a
double entendre or double meaning to the audience, in which case there are
multiple correct meanings (since both ideas are intended and conveyed). A
double meaning can also occur when a legislature seeks to appeal to two
conflicting constituencies at the same time, and intentionally uses ambiguous
language that each side will understand as favoring itself, while “kicking the
can down the road” to courts or some other institution to settle the substantive
dispute.74 In the patent context, intentional ambiguity can occur when patent
applicants seek to convey a narrow meaning to the patent examiner while
conveying a broader meaning to potential competitors.75 In situations where
multiple linguistic meanings are intended and conveyed, the ambiguity is real
and irreducible: a court must construct a legal outcome by using something
other than the linguistic meaning as a guide. All that said, however, such
situations are the exception rather than the rule; in most of life, people do not
routinely speak in gibberish or in double entendre.
3. The Problem of Unfamiliar Language
A different type of interpretative difficulty arises when the text is in an
unfamiliar language. For example, modern readers of Romeo and Juliet are
prone to think that Juliet is asking for Romeo’s location in her famous line:
“wherefore art thou Romeo?”76 This is not because the word “wherefore” is
ambiguous, but simply because we are not members of Shakespeare’s intended
audience of sixteenth-century theater-goers—who would have understood
“wherefore” as meaning “why.” Similarly, the linguistic meaning of a contract
written in Spanish will be difficult for many American readers to understand.
Before judges can debate the legal effect of text in those cases, they first need a

74.
75.
76.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1739 (1995)
(noting that factions can appear to agree while glossing over substantive disagreements).
See infra Subsection IV.D.2.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET 71 (Barbara A. Mowat & Paul Werstine eds.,
Simon & Schuster 2011), act 2, sc. 2, l. 36.
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translation of the linguistic meaning of the text.77 In patent law, a similar
problem arises when claims are written in scientific jargon.78
The correct linguistic meaning of a text written (or spoken) in unfamiliar
languages can generally be discerned if we have available evidence, usually in
the form of dictionaries and expert interpreters. We learned the meaning of
“wherefore” in high school by looking the term up in a dictionary or from our
English teacher. It is important to understand here, though, that dictionaries
and expert interpreters are merely proxies for a deeper inquiry; what we are
ultimately looking for is the understanding of the intended audience.79 Our
English teacher probably learned the meaning of “wherefore” by looking it up
in a dictionary, and the dictionary is likely based on historical evidence of
linguistic usage from sixteenth-century England. While dictionaries and
translators provide indirect evidence of meaning, the best evidence is provided
by the linguistic facts themselves—the patterns of usage that determine
conventional semantic meanings.
As with the resolution of ambiguity, if the deep evidence of linguistic usage
is not available, then the correct linguistic meaning likewise may be
unavailable. For example, we will have considerably more difficulty
understanding the linguistic meaning of the Code of Hammurabi, because our
evidence of Ancient Babylonian linguistic usage is much more limited. There is
still an objectively correct linguistic meaning, but in the absence of historical
evidence we will not be able to reliably discern it. Once again, whether
interpretation can yield the right answer depends on the availability of
evidence. We will discuss how this point applies specifically to scientific jargon
in Subsection V.C.1.

77.
78.
79.

552

See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 30.0(e) (requiring translations of opinions from proceedings in Puerto
Rico courts).
See infra Subsection V.C.1 (discussing the scientific jargon theory of why claim language
might be ambiguous).
See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). Grice formulated the idea
of “speaker meaning” to refer to the meaning that the speaker intends to convey to the
audience based on the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. See
H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, 4 FOUND. LANGUAGE
225 (1968), reprinted in GRICE, supra, at 117.
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C. Construction
1. What Is Construction?
Construction is the activity of determining the legal meaning and effect of a
text. This legal meaning may or may not have anything to do with the
linguistic meaning: as we discussed above, courts in fact construe “Congress”
in the First Amendment differently from its linguistic meaning.
As an initial matter, it is important not to confuse the interpretationconstruction distinction with another concept that is familiar to patent lawyers,
which is the distinction between the construction of claim text and its
application to the facts of a specific accused product.80 It is hornbook patent
law that a court should construe a claim before applying its construction to the
accused product.81 Thus, if a patentee claims “a table,” the court will first
engage in construction: it will decide, as a legal matter, what the patentee’s
legal monopoly covers. For example, the court may decide that the monopoly
covers only “plastic apparatuses with six legs” (construction). The court will
then look at the accused product to see if it actually is a plastic apparatus with
six legs (application).
Our point in separating interpretation from construction is quite different:
it is to point out that the mere fact that a court says a “table” must be made of
plastic and have six legs for legal purposes (construction) does not prove that
this is the linguistic meaning of the word “table” (interpretation). A reader can
slice the concepts more finely, as the “interpretation-construction-application
distinction.” For our purposes, it does not matter whether application is part of
the process of construction or instead constitutes a distinct step. We do not
focus on the application step because (in the patent law context) it almost
invariably follows from the construction.82 After a court has determined the
legal scope of a patent monopoly, it is almost always a straightforward matter
of bringing the accused product into the courtroom to determine whether it
infringes.83

80.

81.
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See Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 50 (using the labels of “interpretation” and
“construction” to refer to the distinction between the construction of claim text and its
application to the facts of a specific accused product).
See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 837 (arguing that the meaning of a legal text may not
be separable from its application).
Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“‘[T]o decide
what the claims [legally] mean is nearly always to decide the case.’” (quoting Markman v.
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An essential difference between interpretation and construction is that the
former deals with a factual question, while the latter deals with legal
consequences and is irreducibly normative. It is a category mistake to say that
the linguistic meaning of “Congress” should be “all government” because of the
terrible consequences that would otherwise result, or based on some other
moral or political theory of good outcomes. The linguistic meaning is factual;
there is no “should” in that question. But it is a perfectly reasonable—if also
contestable—argument to say that the legal scope of the word “Congress”
should be construed to cover all government because there are good arguments
of policy and principle for that result.
The fact that construction is thickly normative does not mean it is arbitrary.
Rather, much of legal theory attempts to prescribe principles for construction
to avoid arbitrariness. Utilitarian economists argue for constructions that
maximize economic efficiency; deontologists argue for constructions that
comport with a particular moral view; and textualists argue for constructions
that adhere to the linguistic meaning of the text. All are theories of
construction.
It is helpful to distinguish two different levels of normativity in the
construction of legal texts. A particular act of construction might involve what
we can call “first-order normativity”—where considerations of policy and
principle are brought directly to bear on the construction of a particular legal
text, such as by asking what the best construction of “Congress” would be to
serve the policy purposes of the First Amendment. We can distinguish this sort
of normativity from the use of normative considerations to justify a general
method or theory of construction. For example, we might justify textualism
(plain meaning statutory interpretation or originalism) on normative grounds,
but then adopt a principle of strict construction that minimizes the role of firstorder normativity. We can call this second role for normativity (at the level of
theory or method), “second-order normativity.”
What emerges from the distinction between the two levels of normativity is
that there are two somewhat different kinds of construction. The first kind
occurs when the text is vague and the dispute falls within the construction
zone. In this situation, virtually no one contests that courts may legitimately
use non-linguistic considerations to fill the gap—there is no other choice.84 The
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Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
concurring))).
Some authors do, however, contest whether such interpretative gaps ever occur. See John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). In the
constitutional context, some theorists argue that linguistic uncertainty requires judicial
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second kind occurs when a court adopts an anti-textualist second-order theory
of construction, which then has the effect of overriding even perfectly clear text
in at least some cases.85 We explore these two distinct kinds of construction
below.
2. Choosing a Second-Order Theory of Construction
Much of the resistance to the interpretation-construction distinction, we
suspect, is driven by a belief that it inherently favors textualism and disfavors
anti-textualist theories of construction. We emphasize that this is not the case.
The interpretation-construction distinction identifies whether the linguistic
meaning is being followed in a judicial decision or legal argument, but it says
nothing about whether the linguistic meaning should be followed. The
distinction itself merely identifies this as a question to be asked.
We admit, of course, that asking the question has a political effect: there is
a strong intuition within our legal and political culture that text should be
followed if it is clear.86 When a legal text produces an outcome that is perceived
as unwise or unjust, it is much easier for a judge or advocate to avoid the
outcome by characterizing the text as “unclear” (and then “interpreting” the
text in a congenial manner) than by openly arguing that the text should be
overridden.87 Exposing the true nature of the anti-textualist argument

85.
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87.

deference to the actions of the political branches. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking,
92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2012); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe
Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 881-82 (2009); see also Solum, supra
note 11, at 511-16 (discussing the views of both Lawson and Paulsen).
The debate between originalists and living constitutionalists can be seen as a dispute about
this kind of constitutional construction. Originalists affirm the view that the original
meaning of the constitutional text should constrain decisions, limiting the judicial role to
gap-filling. Some living constitutionalists believe that other factors can authorize an override
of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. See Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and
Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 16667 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN
AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) and JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)).
See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2011) (“At some level . . . everyone is and always has been a
textualist.”).
For example, an advocate is more likely to convince a court to apply the First Amendment to
the President by arguing that the word “Congress” is unclear (and should be “interpreted”
to cover the President) than by overtly arguing that the constitutional text should be
overridden by a judicial decision.
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therefore makes it less likely that courts will accept it.88 But this effect is a
function of our legal and political culture; it is not intrinsic to the
interpretation-construction distinction itself. All the interpretationconstruction distinction does is identify the real issue at stake while remaining
neutral as to its resolution: it demands that textualists state a normative
justification for following linguistic meaning just as much as it demands that
anti-textualists state one for refusing to do so.
The fact that the interpretation-construction distinction does not
inherently favor any particular theory of construction, but merely exposes the
question as one to be asked, can be seen more clearly by looking at contexts in
which the normative justification for following text is less obvious than in
constitutional law (where the obvious justification is democratic legitimacy).
Consider the situation of a contract of adhesion: while the general normative
justification for following contract text is that the text has been consented to by
both parties, for boilerplate contracts—which consumers almost never read—
such consent is arguably lacking.89 Because the normative justification for
enforcing the text of boilerplate contracts is weaker than for fully dickered
contracts, there is enormous controversy over whether courts should enforce
adhesion contracts according to their text.90 The contribution of the
interpretation-construction distinction here is that it allows us to see the
underlying mechanics of the debate: properly understood, the argument
against enforcing boilerplate contracts is not that the text is linguistically
unclear (indeed, they are usually drafted to be extremely clear), but that
following the text is normatively unjustified. And, although some contract
scholars are upfront about their real argument,91 the judicial rhetoric is often
more clouded: formal doctrine usually states that contracts of adhesion must
be enforced as written unless the text is ambiguous,92 which then leads many
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See Solum, supra note 11, at 478 (“[L]egal advocates might have a practical reason for
conflating meaning and effect and hence for resisting the interpretation-construction
distinction. If you were arguing for a result that is inconsistent with the meaning
(communicative content) of the text, it would be convenient if your theory of
‘interpretation’ did not require you to confront that meaning directly.”).
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 21-24, 31-32 (2013).
For a collection of essays presenting a variety of viewpoints, see generally BOILERPLATE: THE
FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 89, at 19-32; Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983).
See, e.g., Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282-83 (N.Y. 1978).
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judges and advocates to find “ambiguities” that are not really linguistic
ambiguities at all.93
In patent law, we think the normative case for overriding claim language—
or at least doing so in ways that are unfavorable to the patentee—is quite
obvious once one thinks about it. Patent claims are drafted by the patentee,94
which means that they are likely to be written in self-serving ways that
aggrandize patentee rights at the expense of the public.95 There is no obvious
normative reason why courts should defer to self-serving claim language. But
virtually no one in the existing literature has explicitly made this normative
argument for ignoring patentee-written claim language, at least not in these
terms. Although there are isolated passages in the literature that point to the
fact that patent claims are drafted by patentees, the problem is almost always
still framed in terms of saying that patentees will draft claim language in an
unclear manner.96 Critics of patentee-written claims generally do not argue that
patentees will draft claim language in a clear but self-servingly broad manner,
which is what we think is the real objection.97
In sum, nothing about the interpretation-construction distinction requires
that the linguistic meaning be followed simply because it is there. What the
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This was carried to the extreme by Chief Justice Traynor in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45 (Cal. 1968), where he argued that all
text is inherently ambiguous. For the parallel of this move in patent law, see infra Subsection
V.C.3 (discussing Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
Broad claim language is not inevitably favorable to the patentee, in that it also increases the
likelihood of the claim being invalidated. See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation:
Some Comments, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967). But, because courts have a strong
bias against invalidating claims, a patentee will almost always favor broader language. See
Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (noting structural barriers to invalidating claims).
See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Plager, J., concurring) (observing that “claim drafters . . . want claims that serve as
business weapons and litigation threats” but characterizing the resulting problem as one of
“indefinite and ambiguous claims”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-57 (describing
the problem as patentees having incentives to draft vague claims); Burk & Lemley, supra
note 1, at 1762 (stating the concern that “patent drafters can deliberately introduce
ambiguity”); Kristen Osenga, Cooperative Patent Prosecution: Viewing Patents Through a
Pragmatics Lens, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 115, 166 (2011) (“More often than not, the inventor
submits ambiguous or vague claims with hopes that later interpretation of the claims will
provide broader coverage . . . .”).
See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57 (expressing the concern as vague claims
leading to overbroad patents); Burk, supra note 2, at 112 (expressing the concern as that “the
intrinsic imprecision of text[] inevitably leads to a reading that is even broader than the
patent drafter might originally have expected”).
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interpretation-construction distinction does is expose the need for a normative
choice about whether the linguistic meaning should be followed, and it
identifies when participants in a debate are really arguing over this question.
The proper resolution of the question depends on the type of text at issue, as
well as the individual circumstances and the normative commitments of the
decision-maker.
3. Filling Gaps and Drawing Lines on Vagueness
Even if we adopt a textualist perspective, it is essential to concede that most
legal texts will still leave some gaps that require further construction to fill. A
city ordinance that says “no loud music after 10 p.m.” communicates a coherent
and understandable idea, but the idea is incomplete in terms of dictating legal
outcomes—we do not know how loud is too loud for a violation.98 Courts must
then engage in construction by drawing a line.
Drawing lines in this way is irreducibly normative. The word “loud” by
itself will not communicate whether sixty decibels is too loud or not. There are
some easy cases—holding a rock concert in a residential backyard will clearly
violate the ordinance—but there will also necessarily be hard cases where
normative judgment plays a role.99 Again, such judgments are not necessarily
arbitrary; courts can look to normative theories such as utilitarian economics or
natural rights theory to supply a principle. Our point is that one cannot draw
this line solely based on the linguistic meaning of the words: “no loud music
after 10 p.m.”
There is one exception to this point, which is that words that appear to be
vague according to their general usage may have a more precise linguistic
meaning if the author and the reader share a special understanding about
semantic usage that is not apparent to an outside audience without context. For
example, if you go to McDonald’s and ask for a “large” cup of Coke, the server
will give you a very precise size, because here the word “large” has a special
semantic meaning that you and the server both share and understand.
Similarly, although the word “high” is vague when used in its general sense, if
your doctor tells you that you have “high blood pressure,” he probably means
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99.
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Cf. TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 57-58 (2000) (giving a similar example of
vagueness).
See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 60708 (1958) (arguing that logical deduction alone cannot resolve cases on the penumbra of
legal rules). But see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279-90 (1977) (arguing
that there is a right answer to every legal question).
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that you have a blood pressure above 140/90 mmHg.100 A patent claiming a
method of treating “high blood pressure” thus would not be vague. In
situations where words have precise contextualized definitions, they are not
vague and do not require construction (at least, not beyond choosing to follow
the linguistic meaning). At the same time, because the special understanding
must occur between the author and the reader within a narrow context (the
word “large” only has this special meaning inside a McDonald’s store, and only
for ordering soft drinks, and “high” means more than 140/90 mmHg only
when referring to human blood pressure), this phenomenon virtually never
applies to words in laws of general application. A special understanding that
applies to everyone and across multiple contexts is no longer a special
understanding.
We should also make clear that a certain category of cases do not involve
vagueness, even though at first blush they might be thought to. A good
example is Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc.,101 which concerned
whether the word “animal” in a patent claim included humans. A reader might
be tempted to think of this as an instance of fuzzy boundaries—the word
“animal” may or may not include humans, and humans therefore seem like a
borderline case. But this is really a case of ambiguity, not vagueness. There is
no problem of blurred boundaries—nobody asks how animal-ish a human is—
but rather the problem is that there are two discrete senses to the word
“animal.” In the first sense, the word “animal” refers to all members of the
biological kingdom of Animalia, including humans. In the second sense, the
word “animal” is specifically used to counter-distinguish humans. The fact that
the latter category is a subset of the former does not make this a vagueness
problem. The two competing senses of “animal” are still discrete: they are not a
continuum and do not have intermediate cases. This makes it a problem of
ambiguity and not of vagueness. It is therefore not necessary to resort to gapfilling to determine the correct outcome. Rather, as the court held, the word
“animal” in the patent included humans because the patentee expressly stated
that the word “animal” was being used in its first sense of referring to all
members of the kingdom of Animalia.102

100.
101.
102.

WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 198 (3d ed. 2008).
579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1380. We should note that we are not unsympathetic to the dissent’s argument that, if
the patentee were using the word “animal” to include humans, this would make much of the
other language in the patent specification rather strange. For example, the patentee spoke of
“raising an animal” by feeding it, which is not usually the type of language one would use in
referring to humans. Id. at 1383-84 (Lourie, J., dissenting). At least, we think that the
dissent’s argument here is properly characterized as a linguistic argument about
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D. Payoffs
At this point, some readers may ask about payoffs. Some readers might
suspect that the interpretation-construction distinction is either artificial or
useless.103 That is, the crux of the distinction is that there is an identifiable
concept of linguistic meaning. But we then concede that (1) the linguistic
meaning does not necessarily need to be followed, and (2) it will not always
answer all the questions even if it is followed. If the linguistic meaning does
not necessarily matter, then who cares?
To this we have several responses. First, courts purport to care. Just about
every type of legal analysis—constitutional, statutory, contract, probate,
patent—takes as a matter of formal doctrine that courts are merely
“interpreting” the text according to some objective meaning and are not
“rewriting” the text according to their own policy preferences.104 We think that
the linguistic meaning accurately captures this idea of an objective textual
meaning upon which courts purport to base their decisions.
It is helpful at this point to add a clarification. We believe that the linguistic
meaning is a real feature of human communication, and we are merely trying
to capture that reality with our definition; it is not an artificial construct that
we have simply made up. That is, when people read the word “Congress,” they
have an intuitive understanding that it refers to the legislative organ of the
federal government, and this intuition remains even after they read a Supreme
Court case applying the First Amendment to state judicial injunctions. Ours is
largely a descriptive theory of how legal analysis works underneath the hood
(including sometimes being deeply buried in the subconscious), to more clearly
articulate what explains our intuitive responses to the text.
Second, it is essential to isolate the linguistic meaning, and distinguish it
from the legal effect, because otherwise legal analysis has a tendency to fall into
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interpretation, and it is not an unreasonable argument at that. We simply agree with the
majority insofar as we think the balance of linguistic clues favors the majority’s reading.
See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 837 (suggesting that “interpretation is
ultimately an act of application”); Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a
Form of Legal Interpretation, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 40, 41 n.2 (2012) (“This
article rejects the interpretation-construction distinction as artificial.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2001)
(“Because federal courts interpret, rather than author, the federal criminal code, we are not
at liberty to rewrite it.”); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (“No matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not
rework claims. They only interpret them.”); Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, 647 N.E.2d 1298, 1302
(N.Y. 1995) (“The court’s role is limited to interpretation and enforcement of the terms
agreed to by the parties; it does not include the rewriting of their contract . . . .”).
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circular, confused, or misleading argumentation. That is, the standard doctrine
in almost every area says that courts follow the “meaning” of text. If, for this
purpose, the “meaning” referred to the legal effect, then we would have a
circularity: the court follows the meaning of text, but the meaning is the legal
outcome, which is entirely within the control of the court.105 Under this
standard, a court could do anything and it would always be right, which would
make clear thinking impossible. Legal argumentation that collapses the
interpretation-construction distinction is confused or misleading when
considerations that bear on construction (first- or second-order normative
reasons) are used to make arguments about linguistic meaning.106 As our
example regarding the First Amendment illustrates, this logically fallacious
mode of argument—trying to twist the linguistic meaning of “Congress” into
covering all government based on policy considerations—is common among
lawyers.
Third, distinguishing interpretation from construction is important
because it allows us to diagnose the causes of legal problems and uncertainties.
The conflation of legal and linguistic meaning results in a situation where
commentators are prone to blame language for any and all uncertainty in legal
effect: if courts apply a legal text in uncertain ways, then commentators say this
is because the language is not clear enough. And it quickly follows from this
diagnosis that they seek cures to make the language clearer.
Once we draw a distinction between legal and linguistic meaning, it
becomes clear that this is a category mistake: not all legal uncertainty can be
attributed to linguistic faults. The search for a linguistic solution will therefore
often end up being misguided. As we shall discuss later, the category mistake
(and the wild goose chase for a linguistic solution to legal uncertainty) is
endemic in patent law.107
Fourth, the interpretation-construction distinction offers an indispensable
middle ground in debates about textualism. Without the interpretationconstruction distinction, debates about textualism tend toward two
dichotomous extremes: textualists argue that text alone can resolve every legal
issue and policy considerations should never enter judicial decision-making;108
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See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) (“‘[Y]our decision is what you say it is’ would be
tautological nonsense as an argument to the Supreme Court.”).
See infra Subsection IV.C.2.
See infra Subsection IV.C.1.
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 14-16 (2012) (arguing that legal analysis can and should “begin[] and end[]
with what the text says and fairly implies”).
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anti-textualists jump to the opposite extreme and argue that, because text alone
cannot answer every legal question, it is therefore utterly worthless.109 What
the interpretation-construction distinction shows is that both sides are
overstating their case and creating a false dichotomy. Contrary to what the
textualists claim, the linguistic meaning of text cannot resolve every question—
at some point meaning runs out. Contrary to the anti-textualists, this does not
prove that text is utterly worthless—it can answer at least some questions. We
hasten to repeat that we are not trying to advocate either textualism or antitextualism in this Article. Our point is that one cannot begin to resolve that
debate without first having a clear understanding of both the capabilities and
limitations of language, and that the interpretation-construction distinction
helps clarify those capabilities and limitations.
iii. applying the interpretation-construction distinction
to patent law
Now that we have outlined the interpretation-construction distinction in
broad terms, we will apply this distinction to the specific context of patent
claims. We start by sketching the basic contours of the interpretation and
construction of patent claims. We then apply this framework to the canonical
case of patent claim analysis, and show that the dispute arose primarily because
of normative policy disagreement rather than linguistic ambiguity. In Section
III.C, we then explain how the conventional framing obscures clear thinking
and leads to a fruitless pursuit of incorrect solutions.
A. An Initial Outline
1. Interpreting the Linguistic Meaning of Claims
The interpretation of patent claims is the task of determining their
linguistic meaning. Following our definition above, the linguistic meaning of a
claim is the understanding of the text by the intended audience at the time the
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See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643-44
(Cal. 1968) (arguing against “a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent
meaning of words” (footnote omitted)); Burk, supra note 2, at 116-17 (arguing that judicial
reversal rates in patent claims prove that text is indeterminate); Richard A. Posner, The
Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.tnr.com
/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism
(arguing that textualism has “all the room needed to generate the outcome that favors
Justice Scalia’s strongly felt views”).
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patent is written. Although the true intended audience of a patent will perhaps
vary with an individual patentee (e.g., some patentees might file a patent just
to show off to their friends), it is a reasonable generalization to say that most
patents are filed to disclose an invention to the relevant scientific field and to
claim monopoly rights against competitors, and that these people (i.e.,
scientists and competitors working in the same field) are thus the intended
audience of most patents.110 And because a patent is generally written just
before it is filed, the filing date of a patent provides a reasonable approximation
of the date by which the linguistic meaning is determined.111 It follows that the
linguistic meaning of a claim will generally be the understanding of a person
working in the same field as the patentee (often called a “person skilled in the
art”) at the time of the filing of the patent.
It is important to counter-distinguish linguistic meaning from four
extraneous concepts. The first clarification is that the linguistic meaning does
not depend on the patentee’s unexpressed intent.112 This is important because
courts often refer to a patentee’s intent in attempting to discern the meaning of
a claim,113 but such a standard is prone to circularity. The patentee’s intent, if
characterized at a high level of abstraction, is obvious and known to all: it is to
claim as broad a monopoly as a court will let him get away with.114 Referring to
this standard will make claim interpretation a tautology: courts will interpret
claims according to the patentee’s intent, but the patentee’s intent will be to
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Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A
patent . . . presumes a readership skilled in the field of the invention.”). A true cynic might
argue that patent claims are not written for skilled artisans but for the judge who adjudicates
an infringement dispute. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their
“Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 321, 340 (2008); Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97
MINN. L. REV. 72, 99 (2012) (arguing that the skilled artisan is a hypothetical construct).
This is in some sense true, but one must not use the perspective of an adjudicating judge as
the audience for a legal command, because it makes the analysis completely circular—the
meaning of the command becomes whatever the judge decides. See supra text accompanying
note 105.
Cf. Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(reasoning that a claim’s meaning is assessed as of the filing date).
Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(“No inquiry as to the subjective intent of the applicant or PTO is appropriate . . . .”), aff’d,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853) (stating that claims are to be construed
according to what the patentee “intended to do”).
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 26 (“The overall goal when drafting claims is to make
them as broad as the Patent Office will allow.”).
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claim whatever the courts allow.115 Patentee intent in this broad sense is a
useless point of reference.116
The second clarification is that linguistic meaning refers to how a person
skilled in the art would understand the language of the claim. It does not refer
to that person’s understanding of the patentee’s invention—i.e., the idea that a
patentee is entitled to monopolize.117 This is important because courts often
state that they are interpreting claims in accordance with the patentee’s
invention.118 But a standard based on the patentee’s invention is also ultimately
circular and useless. What a patentee is entitled to monopolize is a legal
judgment that is controlled by courts.119 Thus, referring to such a standard
again makes claim interpretation a tautology: courts will interpret claims
according to a patentee’s legal entitlement, but that legal entitlement will be
whatever the court decides is allowable.120
The third clarification is that, although linguistic meaning depends on the
language of the claim, it is not simply a matter of always going by the literal
dictionary definition. For example, a doctor who says “you are not going to
die” to an emergency room patient is not understood to promise eternal life.121
We are not members of the so-called “‘dictionary uber alles’ school of
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See supra text accompanying note 105.
Patentee intent at a lower level of generality is useful, because the understanding of the
reader will depend on what the patentee intends to communicate through the language. See
GRICE, supra note 79, at 86-116. To avoid the frequent confusion that surrounds discussions
of patentee “intent,” we analyze the linguistic meaning from the perspective of the reader
rather than the author. But one can get to essentially the same results with a careful and
narrow understanding of the patentee intent as what is communicated by language, rather
than a meta-level conception of intent as the patentee’s desired outcome.
Cf. Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (“[I]t is not unusual for there to be a significant difference
between what an inventor thinks his patented invention is and what the ultimate scope of
the claims is . . . .”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 566 (2009)
(“The legal scope of the patent right is not the same as a technical understanding of the
patented invention.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (stating that claims are “to be read
with a view to ascertaining the invention”); Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co.,
261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) (stating that courts look for “what the real merit of the alleged
discovery or invention is”).
Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1122-24 (2011) (explaining that courts face an inherent judgment call when defining the
“invention” for patent scope purposes).
See supra text accompanying note 105.
See Osenga, supra note 96, at 126 (giving this example).
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thought,”122 and we are not advocating unthinking reliance on dictionaries. A
dictionary definition is merely a particular learned author’s opinion about the
common usage of a word in society.123 To the extent that a dictionary definition
can be expected to reflect the usage of persons of skill in the art, it is a useful
proxy for the underlying inquiry. But it is only a proxy, and we ascribe no
magical properties to dictionaries. Dictionaries can be wrong about the
common usage of a word,124 and the common usage in any case can fail to
reflect the particular understandings of a scientific field or fail to capture the
contextual nuances of a particular usage in a particular patent. The important
inquiry for interpretation is always how people in the field would understand
the claim language, qua language, in the context of the patent in which it
appears.
The fourth clarification is that the interpretation-construction distinction is
entirely different from the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence.125 Much conventional case law and literature discusses whether
linguistic meaning is best derived from “intrinsic” evidence such as the patent
specification and prosecution history or “extrinsic” materials such as
dictionaries or expert testimony.126 To us, that debate is a red herring. Both
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence are relevant to interpreting linguistic meaning,
and both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence are relevant to construing legal effect.
Our point is that they are relevant in different ways to each inquiry.127
2. Constructing the Legal Effect of Claims
The construction of claims is the task of determining the legal scope of the
claim, and ultimately of the patent. At this step, a judge has two important
decisions. First, he must decide what weight to give to the linguistic meaning
of the text, if any. As a realist matter, judges do not have to follow the linguistic
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123.

124.
125.
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MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 821 (coining the phrase); see also Nard, supra note 1, at 45 (calling this “hypertextualism”).
More direct evidence of common usage, e.g., a compilation of data about actual usage in
newspaper articles or specialized journals, would be the same as or even better than a
dictionary definition.
See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (finding that, although a dictionary defined
a tomato as a fruit, “in the common language of the people” it was a vegetable).
Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 780
(2011) (associating “the understanding of technologists in the relevant field” with extrinsic
evidence and “legalistic” conclusions with intrinsic evidence).
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Subsection IV.C.3 (describing two different types of “context”).

565

the yale law journal

123:530

2013

meaning in determining claim scope, and as we shall see they regularly do not.
To the extent that judges choose to construct claim scope by some other point
of reference, the outcome (and the certainty/uncertainty of that outcome) will
depend on that alternative point of reference. As we will discuss in more detail
in Section IV.B, the most common alternative point of reference is to construct
patent scope to cover the patentee’s inventive idea.
Secondly, to the extent that a judge chooses the linguistic meaning as his
lodestar, the linguistic meaning may run out. Vague terms such as “near,”
“about,” or “approximately” are common in patent claims,128 and there will
always be the question of how close is close enough. Disputes involving
borderline cases are in the construction zone. In such cases, a judge will have to
resort to some alternative point of reference to resolve the dispute.
B. An Illustration: Phillips v. AWH Corp.
A good way to demonstrate the clarity that the interpretation-construction
distinction brings to the debate is to apply it to Phillips v. AWH Corp.,129 the
canonical case on claim analysis.
In Phillips, the patentee held a patent over a type of reinforced wall, which
had internal steel supports (known as “baffles”). As the patentee had originally
conceived his invention, the reinforced wall was to be used in “jails, bank
vaults, armories, [and] firing ranges,”130 and so he configured the internal steel
supports to deflect bullets.131 Accordingly, in the patent specification, the
patentee described the invention as a wall containing “bullet deflecting
internally directed steel baffles.”132 The patent specification also repeatedly
emphasized bullet resistance as an important advantage of the patentee’s wall
over other walls.133
In the claim, however, the patentee made no mention of configuring the
steel supports to deflect bullets or requiring the wall to have any kind of bullet
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129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676
F.3d 1063, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd.,
476 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 col. 6 ll. 4-5 (filed Apr. 14, 1986).
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310.
’798 Patent, at [57].
Id. at col. 3 ll. 26-32, 43-44; id. at col. 5 ll. 67-68; id. at col. 6 ll. 10-12, 14-17.
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resistance. Instead, the patentee claimed walls made with “internal steel
baffles” generally.134
The dispute arose when the defendant, AWH Corp., manufactured walls
that had internal steel supports, but which were configured in a way that did
not deflect bullets. Thus, pursuant to one reading—if “baffles” referred to any
type of steel support—the defendant would have infringed the patent. But
under an alternative reading—if “baffles” referred only to steel supports that
were configured to deflect bullets—there would have been no infringement.
The Federal Circuit obviously regarded this dispute as one over linguistic
ambiguity, because the court’s opinion features an extended discussion of
proper methodology to discern linguistic meaning.135 Moreover, Judge Lourie
dissented as to the outcome, even while largely agreeing with the majority’s
methodology.136
1. Interpretation
The Federal Circuit regarded the dispute as one over linguistic ambiguity,
but is there any such ambiguity in fact? That is, is there any reasonable dispute
over how a person of ordinary skill in the art (in this case, a builder) would
have understood the claim term “baffle” in the Phillips patent?
Initially, we can concede there is one type of ambiguity in the word. If one
were reading the word entirely without context—if someone randomly came to
you on the street and simply said, “baffle”—the word would have multiple
potential semantic definitions. It can be a noun that refers to a type of support
in walls, or it can be a verb that refers to confusing someone (e.g., “I’m baffled
by what you are saying”). In this sense, the word “baffle” by itself would be
linguistically ambiguous.
But looking at the patent in Phillips quickly eliminates this potential
ambiguity. It is quite clear that the word “baffle” in the patent is being used as
a noun in the sense of wall supports and not as a verb in the sense of confusing
people. Only a minimal amount of context is required to know this: the
surrounding words “internal” and “steel” make it impossible to understand
“baffle” to operate as a verb.

134.
135.

136.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310-11.
Id. at 1314-24; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(per curiam) (ordering rehearing en banc and directing the parties to discuss, among other
things, whether “the public notice function of patent claims [is] better served by referencing
primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a
claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification”).
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328-29 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Not only is there little evidence of ambiguity, there is strong linguistic
evidence of what the word “baffle” means in the context of the patent. The
patent abstract describes the invention as containing “bullet deflecting . . .
baffles.”137 As a semantic matter, this indicates that the word “baffle” is not a
label that refers only to something that inherently deflects bullets. As a matter
of normal English, we say “a Catholic priest” but we do not say “the Catholic
Pope,” because priests are not inherently Catholic while Popes are. Thus, the
fact that the patent uses the words “bullet deflecting . . . baffle” is strong
evidence that the word “baffle” expresses a concept of something that does not
inherently deflect bullets.
At this point, we are likely to get pushback from readers familiar with
patent law, in some variant of this argument: “Yes, the word baffle in the
abstract means steel supports at any angle, but the purpose of this invention—
as indicated by the quote about ‘bullet deflecting . . . baffles’—is to deflect
bullets, and the patentee made that clear in the specification. Therefore, a
builder would understand that the baffle in this patent must be aligned to
deflect bullets.”138
To which our answer is: correct, but that does not go to the linguistic
meaning. The linguistic meaning concerns the person of ordinary skill in the
art’s understanding of the claim language, which is a factual question. It does
not concern the purpose of the invention, which is a policy judgment and legal
construct. This is not to say that the argument is irrelevant to claim analysis.
Saying that the linguistic meaning of “baffles” is steel supports at any angle
does not imply the further proposition that this must be the legal scope of the
claim. Thus, the normative argument should be considered in the construction
step. In the next Subsection, we will show how this works.
2. Construction
The prior Subsection in many ways reflects something that appears in the
Phillips opinion itself. Nobody in Phillips—none of the majority, the dissenters,
the litigants, or the amici—disputed that the “ordinary meaning” of “internal
steel baffle” in the construction industry referred to internal steel supports
generally, rather than steel supports that were configured to deflect bullets.139
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’798 Patent, at [57].
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389,
1393 (2007) (criticizing the Phillips majority because “the court interpreted a claim to
encompass an embodiment . . . that would not achieve the purpose of the invention”).
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (citing a stipulated dictionary definition); id. at 1329 (Lourie, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making no textual argument and arguing only
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What the accused infringer and the dissent argued, however, was that the
purpose of the invention was to have baffles that deflected bullets:
[A] patent specification is intended to describe one’s invention . . . . This
specification makes clear that the “baffles” in this invention are angled.
There is no reference to baffles that show them to be other than angled.
The abstract refers to “bullet deflecting . . . baffles.” Only angled baffles
can deflect. It then mentions “internal baffles at angles for deflecting
bullets.” That could not be clearer.140
As the quote demonstrates, the dissent is not making an argument about
linguistic usage.141 The dissent’s basic argument is that the patentee’s invention
(as shown by the specification) is a bullet-deflecting baffle. Its point is that
“baffle” should mean something that deflects bullets, because otherwise the
claim would cover more than the idea that the patentee had really invented.142
But, as above, this is construction, not interpretation. An argument that
“baffle” must mean something that deflects bullets because otherwise the claim
covers an idea the patentee did not invent has the same form as an argument
that “Congress” must mean all government because otherwise the First
Amendment does not prohibit the President from imprisoning dissidents. Both
are arguments that say that a word, taken by its linguistic meaning, will
produce bad outcomes. Both arguments may have validity, but they are
normative arguments—they are not about linguistic meaning. It is conceptually
clearer, and avoids twisting words into pretzels, to acknowledge that “baffle”
linguistically refers to a steel support at any angle, but suggest that, for policy
reasons, the claim should be given a narrower legal scope, covering only steel
supports that deflect bullets.
This, we submit, is a much clearer and more precise version of what the
dissent’s argument in Phillips really was. Adopting this view of the case allows

140.
141.

142.

that the “specification makes clear that the ‘baffles’ in this invention are angled” (emphasis
added)); id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that claim analysis should be done by
district courts and not opining on the merits).
Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
Several commentators have argued to us that the linguistic meaning of “baffle” is
ambiguous because, accepting that “baffle” refers to any structure that impedes flow, there
would still be no infringement in Phillips given that the accused structure was perpendicular
to the wall. We agree that one could make this linguistic argument in favor of finding noninfringement in Phillips. Our response is that the argument was not made by the dissent and
thus was not the cause of judicial disagreement in the case. Nor does this argument illustrate
any ambiguity in the word “baffle.” The argument is saying that the majority determinately
erred in applying the linguistic meaning of “baffle,” not that the meaning is indeterminate.
See Lemley, supra note 138, at 1393.
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us to see that the two sides were talking past each other with entirely different
modes of argumentation. The majority cites a dictionary definition of “baffle”
and the linguistic usage in the specification;143 the dissent cites the purpose of
the invention.144 Implicitly, the majority adopts a theory of construction where
the linguistic meaning will be followed, while the dissent adopts a theory of
construction that disregards the linguistic meaning in favor of the purpose of
the invention. We are not taking sides here on which is the better theory of
construction. Our point is an antecedent one: it is impossible to see what is
going on without first dissecting the difference between the majority’s focus on
the linguistic meaning of text, given its theory of construction that text must be
followed, and the dissent’s focus on the purpose of the invention as the
reference point for its theory of construction.
C. Prior Articulations of the Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent
Law
At this point, it is useful to note that other authors have previously
distinguished between “interpretation” and “construction” in ways that seem
to track our analysis. We think that this history is helpful to our argument in
proving that the conceptual difference between interpretation and construction
is a real feature of claim analysis and thus has not gone entirely unnoticed by
participants in the patent system. Nonetheless, as we will explain, we also
think that prior articulations of the distinction have not fully captured its
essence, and that the inadequacies of these prior articulations have
unfortunately obscured the underlying importance of drawing the distinction
for purposes of conceptual clarity.
The PTO historically drew the interpretation-construction distinction in
this form: its examiners—as people of skill in the art—“interpret” patent claims
during examination, while courts “construe” claims in litigation to determine
their legal effect.145 The consequence, according to the PTO, was that its
examiners were not bound by the same rules that courts applied to construe
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Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324-25. The majority later argues that its holding does not contradict the
purpose of the invention because the patent never describes bullet resistance as the exclusive
purpose of the invention. Id. at 1325-27. In this way the majority gives some attention to the
purpose of the invention, but only as lip service. The key point is that the majority gives
great weight to linguistic considerations and little weight to the purpose of the invention,
while the dissent does the opposite.
Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 652 (3d ed. 2009).
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patent claims.146 The PTO no longer abides by this position,147 and we think
the position is defective. PTO examiners are still looking at the legal effect of
claims to determine whether the patent is legally entitled to issue, and thus are
doing construction. Nonetheless, the parallels at first glance between the
PTO’s historical position and our articulation of the real conceptual difference
between interpretation and construction are quite obvious.
Another variant of the interpretation-construction distinction has been put
forward by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, who use the label “interpretation” to
denote a determination of the (legal) meaning of the claim while using the
label “construction” to denote the application of the claim language to the
concrete facts of an accused product.148 As we explained in Subsection II.C.1,
we think this is a miscomprehension of what the interpretation-construction
distinction is about, but in any event, we use the terms “interpretation” and
“construction” to refer to different concepts than those proposed by Burk and
Lemley.
In our minds, the closest prior exposition of the interpretation-construction
distinction in patent law appears in Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.149 In that opinion, Judge Newman
stated:
In patent infringement litigation there is often a factual dispute as to
the meaning and scope of the technical terms or words of art as they are
used in the particular patented invention. When such dispute arises its
resolution is not a ruling of law, but a finding of fact. Such findings of
meaning, scope, and usage have been called the “interpretation” of
disputed terms of a document, as contrasted with the “construction” or
legal effect of a document.150
At first glance, this quote from Judge Newman quite closely matches our
conception of the interpretation-construction distinction. Yet it does not fully
capture the essence of the distinction. In Judge Newman’s view, the proper

146.
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See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting the PTO’s position that “the
rules of claim construction in infringement actions differ from the rules for claim
interpretation during prosecution in the PTO”).
ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 652. The PTO does continue to abide by the position that
it construes claims more broadly than courts do during infringement litigation. MPEP § 2111
(8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012). But it no longer relies on a conceptual distinction between
interpretation and construction to maintain its position.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 50.
52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
Id. at 1000 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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interpretation of claims will depend a great deal on what the interpreter thinks
the invention is. As Judge Newman explains later in her dissent, her version of
interpretation looks to the patent specification because it “contains the
description of the invention.”151 We think this is a serious mistake: as explained
above, and as we will emphasize in the next Part, we think that an essential
insight of the interpretation-construction distinction is to distinguish between
the meaning of claim language, qua language, on one hand, and the patentee’s
invention, on the other. In this respect, we think our articulation of the
interpretation-construction distinction is closer to the real conceptual
difference between the two activities, and that our version provides important
insights into claim analysis that Judge Newman’s version obscures.
iv. why disputes are over construction
A. The Conventional Framing: Dictionary Versus Specification as Guides to
Linguistic Meaning
In the conventional framing, the Federal Circuit is divided into two
camps.152 One camp, the “dictionary-first” camp, supposedly sees the
dictionary as being the best guide to linguistic meaning:
Dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, publicly available at the time
the patent is issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable sources
of information on the established meanings that would have been
attributed to the terms of the claims by those of skill in the art. Such
references are unbiased reflections of common understanding . . . not
colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation.153
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Id. at 1002 (emphasis added). We should note here that we have no objection to looking to
the specification as part of the interpretative process. But our reason to look at the
specification—for linguistic context—is very different from Judge Newman’s. See infra
Subsection IV.C.3.
See, e.g., Bender, supra note 1, at 215-16 (discussing conflicting methodologies); Hattenbach,
supra note 5, at 189-90 (criticizing dictionaries and arguing for greater reliance on the
specification); Karen C. Mitch, Pondering a “Baffling” Situation: The “Reconstruction” of
Claim Construction, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 631 (2005) (describing
“uncertainty” resulting from two conflicting methodologies); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent
Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 356-57 (2007)
(distinguishing between the “formalist” and “substantive” approaches); Osenga, supra note
3, at 78 (observing “the split between the dictionary-dependent and the specificationdependent factions”).
Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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The opposing camp, commonly called the “specification-first” camp,
supposedly opposes the dictionary-first camp by arguing that the patent
specification provides a better guide to linguistic meaning:
The best source for understanding a technical term is the specification
from which it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.
The evolution of restrictions in the claims, in the course of examination
in the PTO, reveals how those closest to the patenting process—the
inventor and the patent examiner—viewed the subject matter.154
What happens frequently in cases is that one camp of judges will cite the
dictionary to support a broad construction of the claim, while another camp of
judges will cite the specification for a narrow construction. In Phillips, for
example, the majority opinion invokes a dictionary definition to say that
“baffle” means a steel support capable of “obstruct[ing] the flow of something”
generally,155 while the dissent cites the specification to say that “baffles” in the
particular patent must be angled and capable of deflecting bullets.156
Rhetorically, both sides appear to be pursuing the linguistic meaning, just
using different tools.
B. The Real Dispute: Linguistic Meaning Versus the “True” Invention
The core payoff of applying the interpretation-construction distinction in
patent law is to show that the conventional framing is fundamentally
misconceived. The conflict does not occur because the dictionary-first camp
and the specification-first camp are both pursuing the linguistic meaning but
coming to different results. Rather, the uncertainty in claim analysis arises
because some judges adopt a textualist theory of construction that pursues the
linguistic meaning of claim text while others adopt a theory of construction
that pursues the true invention. It is this age-old conflict between textualism
and anti-textualism—a quintessentially normative conflict—that causes claim
uncertainty. Below, we elaborate on the mechanism by which this conflict
arises.

154.
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Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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1. Doctrine Treats the Patentee’s Invention as Equivalent to the Linguistic
Meaning of Claim Text
Initially, we think it utterly uncontroversial to say that judges routinely
seek to construe claims to cover the patentee’s invention. Indeed it is
considered axiomatic that they do so. Courts treat “the understanding of claim
text by a person of skill in the art” and “the patentee’s invention” as if they
were interchangeable and equivalent concepts. In United States v. Adams, the
Supreme Court says “it is fundamental that claims are to be construed in the
light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining
the invention.”157 In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit holds that the
question for claim construction is “how a person of ordinary skill in the art
understands a claim term.”158 The courts perceive absolutely no difference
between these two formulations. Indeed, often the same case recites both
formulations in one breath.159
2. The Patentee’s Invention Is Not the Linguistic Meaning of Claim Text
What these courts do not appreciate is that the patentee’s invention is not
the linguistic meaning of claim text. The “invention” is the new, useful, and
non-obvious idea that the patentee discloses in the patent specification. The
linguistic meaning of claim text is how a person of ordinary skill in the art
would understand the language of the claim text. The relevant relationship
between the two is that section 112 of the patent statute says the patentee is
supposed to write claim text that covers his actual invention.160 The fact that the
patentee has a statutory duty to write claims that cover the invention, however,
does not mean that patentees inherently comply. It is absurd to equate the
existence of a duty with compliance at a conceptual level. If a tax evader claims
an income of “zero” on his tax return when his actual income was one million
dollars, no one would argue that courts should therefore read “zero” to really
mean “one million.”
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United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966).
415 F.3d at 1313; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 372 (1938)
(framing the question as “whether the language . . . conveyed definite meaning to those
skilled in the art”).
See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Adams, 383 U.S. at 49).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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3. Examples of Conflation
Examples will prove our proposition that courts incorrectly conflate the
two concepts into a single doctrine, which then allows individual judges to
invoke different theories of construction while purporting to apply a shared
concept of “meaning.” Our prior discussion of Phillips already provided one
example.161 In Phillips, beneath a veneer of agreement regarding claim
construction doctrine,162 there is in fact no agreement at all: the majority is
looking for the linguistic meaning of “baffle,” while the dissent is looking for
the true invention.
A second example—with the arguments the same but the results reversed—
is Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.163 The facts of the case
involve a patent on a type of syringe with a “body.” In the patent specification,
all the examples given were of one-piece syringes. The question was whether
the claim term “body” covered a competitor’s two-piece syringe.
The majority opinion began by looking at the ordinary meaning of “body,”
and conceded that the ordinary meaning alone could cover syringes with
multiple pieces. However, it then held:
In this case, while the claims leave open the possibility that the recited
“body” may encompass a syringe body composed of more than one
piece, the specifications tell us otherwise. They expressly recite that “the
invention” has a body constructed as a single structure, expressly
distinguish the invention from the prior art based on this feature, and
only disclose embodiments that are expressly limited to having a body
that is a single piece. Thus, a construction of “body” that limits the term to
a one-piece body is required to tether the claims to what the specifications
indicate the inventor actually invented.164
This quote clearly demonstrates that the Retractable Technologies majority is
construing the scope of the claim based on its conception of what the patentee
invented. This is in contrast to the approach of the Retractable Technologies
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See supra Section III.B.
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328-29 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I
fully join the portion of the court’s opinion resolving the relative weights of specification
and dictionaries in interpreting patent claims . . . . I could elaborate more expansively on
that topic, but Judge Bryson’s opinion for the majority says it so well, there is little reason
for me to repeat its truths.”).
653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1305 (emphasis added).
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dissent, which focuses its analysis on the linguistic meaning of “body.” The
dissent begins by noting that “[t]he ordinary and customary meaning of ‘body’
does not inherently contain a one-piece structural limitation.”165 It then argues
that the fact that the patentee used the words “one-piece body” in the
specification actually creates a linguistic inference that “body” is not limited to a
single piece object: if the patentee had thought that “body” was a label for an
object that inherently had only a single piece, then the phrase “one-piece body”
would be redundant.166 Once again, we have two camps that are speaking past
each other because they are looking for different things.
A final example that illustrates why this divide causes so much uncertainty
is Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. Hemcon, Inc.,167 where the en banc
Federal Circuit divided exactly 5-5. In Marine Polymer, the patentee invented a
process for creating a type of polymer, known as poly-ß-14-Nacetylglucosamine (p-GlcNAc), which is useful in medical applications.168 In
particular, the patentee developed what he called “biocompatible” p-GlcNAc,
which everyone agreed was a reference to the compound’s degree of biological
reactivity (lower reactivity was better).169 The precise question at issue was
whether the word “biocompatible” specifically denoted zero reactivity.
In the first opinion, authored by Judge Lourie, one half of the court argued
that “biocompatible” meant that a compound must have zero detectable
reactivity.170 Judge Lourie based his decision exclusively on a passage from the
specification that stated: “[I]t is demonstrated that the p-GlcNAc of the
invention exhibits no detectable biological reactivity.”171
In the second opinion, authored by Judge Dyk, the other half of the court
argued that “biocompatible” meant only that a compound exhibits low
reactivity and did not necessarily have to exhibit zero detectable reactivity.172
Judge Dyk based his decision on the fact that the patentee had written two sets
of claims173: In one set of claims, the patentee had claimed all “biocompatible”
p-GlcNAc compounds generically;174 while in the other set of claims he had
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Id. at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Id. at 1354 (opinion of Lourie, J.).
Id. at 1354-55.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1358 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1368 (opinion of Dyk, J.).
Id.
See U.S. Patent No. 6,864,245 col. 71 ll. 57-65 (filed July 11, 2003).
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specifically claimed a “biocompatible poly-ß-14-N-acetylglucosamine . . .
which has an elution test score of 1” (the elution test is a test of reactivity, with a
score of zero denoting no detectable reactivity).175 If the word “biocompatible”
itself denoted a compound that had zero detectable reactivity, then a claim to
“biocompatible p-GlcNAc having an elution test score of 1” (denoting low
detectable reactivity) would be nonsensical.
Once we conceptually distinguish between the linguistic meaning and the
patentee’s invention, it becomes clear again that the court is really disagreeing
over the proper theory of construction. Judge Lourie’s opinion is focusing on
what the patentee invented. Judge Dyk’s opinion is focusing on what the
linguistic rules of English tell us about the linguistic meaning of the word
“biocompatible.” There is in fact no contradiction between saying that the
word “biocompatible” means low (and not necessarily zero) detectable
reactivity as a linguistic matter, and saying that the invention is p-GlcNAc of
zero detectable reactivity. What we must realize is that the linguistic meaning
of the claim language does not always reflect the patentee’s invention. The
widespread perception that the two sides disagree over linguistic meaning
occurs only because of the incorrect conflation of the linguistic meaning with
the substantive invention.
C. The Consequences of Conflation
1. The Incorrect Diagnosis of Linguistic Indeterminacy
The first pernicious consequence of the conceptual confusion in this area is
that courts and commentators wrongly attribute legal uncertainty to linguistic
defects. As we have shown, in many of the most prominent cases, the conflict
and uncertainty about legal outcomes is not attributable to any kind of
linguistic uncertainty—the linguistic meaning of the disputed terms in Phillips,
Retractable Technologies, and Marine Polymer is quite clear, and the antitextualist side in these cases did not make any linguistic arguments to dispute
the meaning of the claim. Rather, the counterargument in all these cases is that
the linguistic meaning departs from the patentee’s actual invention. That may
be a good argument, but it is not a linguistic argument.

175.

Id. at col. 72 ll. 1-2 (emphasis added).
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2. Obscuring Judicial Policy-Making
A second pernicious consequence of the conflation is that judges obscure
their policy-making role under the guise of debating an objective linguistic
question.176 That is, a judge who argues for construing a claim according to the
true invention is really making a policy argument about the optimal degree of
patent scope. But, under the rhetoric of the linguistic indeterminacy thesis, the
issue is framed as a pure linguistic debate that is independent of judicial policy
views. The conflation thus has the harmful consequence of rendering judicial
decisions less transparent and shielding judges from the need to explain and
justify their policy decisions.
In order to fully appreciate why judges are invariably making policy
judgments in claim construction, it is first important to understand that “the
true invention” is not an objective fact that has independent existence outside
the control of courts.177 Rather, it is a legal construct: a court looking for “the
true invention” will invariably find that the invention is whatever the judge
thinks it is.
This requires some explanation. The patentee’s invention can generally be
understood as the new, useful, and non-obvious idea that is disclosed in the
patent.178 Whether an idea is “useful” entirely depends on what kinds of things
the judge thinks are useful to society (using some theory of social utility),
which is a matter of subjective judgment rather than objective fact. More
counterintuitively, “the” idea that is disclosed in the patent is also a matter of
judgment rather than fact because every patent contains an almost-infinite
array of new and useful ideas at different levels of abstraction. Choosing one
idea to call the inventive idea is therefore a legal construct.
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Farnsworth made a similar point regarding the conflation of interpretation and construction
in contract law. Specifically, he wrote that courts have “often ignored [the interpretationconstruction distinction] by characterizing the process of construction as that of
‘interpretation’ in order to obscure the extent of their control over private agreement.” E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 478 (1982).
Chiang, supra note 119, at 1122-23. Oskar Liivak argues that “the invention” is an objective
concept and that patent scope should be limited to the invention. Liivak, supra note 43, at 5.
One of us has criticized Liivak’s definition of the invention elsewhere. Tun-Jen Chiang,
Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1211, 1237 & n.154 (2012).
For present purposes, we merely note that, even if the invention could be defined in some
objective manner, there would still be a second-order normative policy choice about whether
to have patent scope governed by the linguistic meaning of the claim language or by the
invention. Thus, we believe that the most significant issues raised by Liivak’s argument go
to construction rather than interpretation.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006) (outlining the conditions for obtaining a patent).
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To see this, consider the example given in Section I.A of the Wright
brothers, who invented the first working airplane in the form of a wooden
glider. Is their invention:
“All flying machines,” including helicopters?
“All flying machines with fixed wings,” including jets?
“All wooden flying machines,” including World War I fighter planes that
were much better than the Wright glider?
“A single barely flying wooden glider, down to the paint color,” which
would be instantly outdated?
Each of these ideas can be accurately described as the invention; they differ
only in their level of abstraction. There is no objectively correct answer to
selecting among these competing ideas. Because there is no objective “true
invention,” saying that judges should award patent scope according to the true
invention creates a circularity: the true invention is ultimately whatever a judge
finds it to be, and the judge that uses the true invention as his lodestar will
simply end up importing his own beliefs about desirable patent scope into law.
We should make clear that having judges make policy judgments about
desirable patent scope is not necessarily a bad thing: because there is no
objective “true invention,” somebody has to make the judgment call on the scope
of the patent, and it is not clear there are better alternatives than having a judge
do it. Nor is saying that judges make “policy” the same as saying that courts are
super-legislatures that do whatever they feel like: judges may draw on a wide
range of principles, from utilitarian economics to natural rights theory, to
guide their decision-making. Our point is that the determination necessarily
requires a judge to exercise normative judgment, and pretending that claim
analysis is a linguistic question obscures this judicial policy-making role. In
much of the existing literature, people speak as if the courts were simply
debating what the patentee did in writing the claim language.179 This view is so
pervasive that academics routinely criticize the Federal Circuit for not being
policy-oriented enough.180 The obfuscation means that courts are relieved from
having to explain and justify their policy decisions.
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See supra Section I.B.
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1671 (2003) (“The Federal Circuit has proven particularly resistant to considering patent
policy in making its decisions.”); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2,
29-33 (2010) (arguing that the Federal Circuit is formalist and resists considering policy
arguments); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent

579

the yale law journal

123:530

2013

We should also make clear the nature of the policy disagreements at issue.
Thus far, we have spoken of “textualists” and “anti-textualists” as if individual
judges always fell into one camp or the other. But in fact judges sometimes
oscillate between the approaches depending on other policy considerations,
such as their first-order preferences on patent scope. That is, claims are written
by patentees, and one can expect self-interested patentees to write the claim
text broadly as a general matter. A textualist methodology will therefore tend
to result in broader monopolies than an anti-textualist methodology. It is
therefore no surprise that an individual judge can one day argue that the plain
meaning of claim language should govern even when it results in a completely
nonsensical invention, and the next day turn around and argue that the
specification of the invention should override the plain meaning of claim
text.181 The judge is simply being a fair weather textualist, who adopts
textualism only when it produces an outcome that coincides with his firstorder preferences on patent scope.182 A judge who thinks that an invention is
very significant (and that the patentee therefore deserves a broad monopoly)
will favor textualism for that particular case. Stated this way, it should be clear
that even a seemingly textualist judge might really be acting on his first-order
normative preferences. Once again, our agenda is not to praise seeminglytextualist judges or disparage seemingly-anti-textualist judges. Our point is to
expose the policy disagreements that underlie claim construction disputes and
explain why these disputes are not linguistic.
3. Conflating Linguistic Context with Policy Context
A particular example of the confused nature of the discourse—which the
conflated thinking has caused—is the misuse of the word “context.”

181.
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System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1125-26 (2003) (arguing for measures to “dislodge
the Federal Circuit from its rigid adherence to formalism”).
Compare Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (Plager, J., dissenting) (arguing for a plain meaning approach even when it
causes the invention to be inoperative), with Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Plager, J., concurring) (arguing that claims should
be construed according to the specification of the invention).
See Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone
Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 805 (2008) (“[O]bserving, say, textualist decisions in the world
may tell us more about textualists than it tells us about textualism.”).
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Anti-textualists in patent law routinely emphasize the importance of
context to understanding language.183 They criticize textualist judges for their
tendency to over-rely on dictionary definitions, because such definitions do not
consider the context within which a disputed claim term appears.184 They
argue that the specification is important to claim interpretation because it
provides context.185 At a facial level, we agree with all of these statements.
The problem is that there are two kinds of context. The first, which we will
call the “linguistic context,” is context that helps an interpreter discern the
linguistic meaning. The second, which we will call the “policy context,” is
information that is relevant to resolving a policy issue under some secondorder normative framework. For example, if one thinks that society should seek
to award the economically efficient degree of patent scope,186 then an
important piece of policy context is what the patentee himself believed to be his
invention (because it is generally economically inefficient to award more than
this).
To see the difference between these two types of context, consider again the
example of Phillips. In Phillips, the key disagreement between the majority and
the dissent is what to make of the specification’s statement that the invention
comprises “bullet deflecting . . . baffles.” As linguistic context, the phrase tells
us that the word “baffle” does not refer to something that inherently deflects
bullets (because otherwise the “bullet deflecting” modifier is redundant). But,
as policy context, it tells us that the patentee regarded it as crucial that the
invention deflect bullets, and therefore it would be bad policy to award the
patentee a monopoly covering non-bullet-deflecting objects. Although the
statement unquestionably provides important context to analyzing the claim,
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See, e.g., Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[C]laims . . .
do not have meaning removed from the context from which they arose.”); Burk & Lemley,
supra note 37, at 49-52; Mullally, supra note 152, at 365-71.
See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
“ordinary and customary meaning” of a claim term must be discerned by reference to “the
context of the intrinsic record” and not by reference to “a dictionary, treatise, or other
extrinsic source”).
See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The
specification contains a written description of the invention . . . . Thus, the specification is
always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.”).
The efficiency standard is the dominant paradigm for determining scope in the patent
literature. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and
the avoidance of monopolies . . . .”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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its particular relevance depends on the kind of analysis (linguistic versus
policy) that one is doing.
In patent law debates, the two distinct concepts of “context” have been
conflated. In rhetorical debates, anti-textualists emphasize the importance of
linguistic context and the inadequacy of dictionaries alone to determine
linguistic meaning.187 But in actual application to facts, they end up looking at
policy context and making their decisions on that basis.188 Judge Lourie’s dissent
in Phillips is not looking at the context of “bullet deflecting . . . baffles” for its
linguistic implications.
The same two-step occurs in the patent literature, where scholars
rhetorically emphasize linguistic context but end up advocating for a policy
analysis. For example, Burk and Lemley start with the proposition that the
correct understanding of claim language depends on “context,”189 but their
ultimate position is that courts should look to “the importance of the invention
in the industry, the nature of the technology, how this invention relates to
others in producing marketable products, and the relationship between the
patentee’s invention and the accused device.”190 Peter Lee begins by criticizing
a “literalist” approach that “deprioritizes contextual factors,”191 but what he
really wants is for courts to look for “a patented invention’s technological
contribution.”192 Kelly Mullally begins by noting that “words have no meaning
apart from their context,”193 but then argues that courts should adopt a
“substantive” methodology that construes claims according to “the context of
the invention.”194 Finally, Chris Cotropia argues for “[c]ontextualizing the
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See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477-78 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims
are construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with
an understanding of their meaning in the field . . . . Thus the court starts the
decisionmaking process by reviewing the same resources as would that person, viz., the
patent specification and the prosecution history.”).
See, e.g., Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“The specification contains a written description of the
invention . . . . Thus, the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction
analysis.” (emphasis added)).
Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 49-51.
Id. at 54.
Lee, supra note 2, at 103-04; see also supra text accompanying note 64 (criticizing the literalist
approach).
Lee, supra note 2, at 105.
Mullally, supra note 152, at 365.
Id. at 369-70.
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claim meaning within the complete patent document,”195 but what he really
wants is for courts to look for “information about the inventive activity of the
patentee.”196 Only by applying the interpretation-construction distinction can
one see that these scholars are using two different versions of “context” in their
arguments.
The fact that “context” has become code for a look-for-the-real-invention
policy analysis has a follow-on consequence, which is that textualists treat
“context” as if it were a dirty word. This induces textualists to emphasize
acontextual dictionary definitions above all else.197 Anti-textualists then
rhetorically criticize the “dictionary uber alles” approach as ignoring context,
and a vicious cycle of each side talking past the other is reinforced.
Beyond the problem of talking past each other, the undue emphasis on
dictionaries leads textualists to interpretations that are inaccurate. An example
of this error is the dissent in Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group,
Inc.198 In Kinetic Concepts, the patent pertained to a type of medical treatment.
The claim recited “a treatment for a wound,” and the question was whether
“wound” meant any type of injury to body tissue generally or only an injury to
skin. The majority held that it meant only injuries to skin,199 while Judge Dyk
in dissent argued that it meant any type of injury.200 Judge Dyk’s primary
argument was that, because the medical dictionary says that a “wound” means
any kind of injury to body tissue, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand this to be so.201
To the extent that the dissent was looking for the linguistic meaning, it
erred. It erred because, in the specification, the patentee describes placing a pad
“onto the normal skin surrounding the wound.”202 This sentence contains the
embedded semantic assumption that “wound” refers to something that happens
to skin, in two ways: (1) it would make no sense to speak of “normal” skin if
there weren’t something that could be considered “abnormal” skin, and the
abnormal skin is the wound; (2) if “wound” did not refer to something that is
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Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1880 (2012)
(emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(emphasizing dictionaries).
554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1027-29 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1028-29.
U.S. Patent No. 5,636,643, col. 11 ll. 9-10 (filed Mar. 9, 1993).
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inherently on the skin, it would make no sense to speak of skin “surrounding”
a wound. Because a reading of the specification would reveal that the patentee
thought that the word “wound” semantically referred to objects on the skin, the
intended reader of the patent would likewise come to this conclusion, which
makes it the proper linguistic meaning.203
As this example illustrates, context is essential to proper interpretation.
And an important source of linguistic context for most patent claims will be the
specification, which is a part of the same document, is written by the same
author, and is directed to the same audience.204 We therefore agree that the
context of the specification is essential to a proper understanding of the
linguistic meaning.
But our agreement is limited to use of linguistic context to understand
linguistic meaning, which is not what the advocates of considering
specification “context” have in mind. The majority in Kinetic Concepts (led by
Judge Lourie) did not make any of the linguistic arguments we have outlined.
Instead, the majority simply argued: “All of the examples described in the
specification involve skin wounds. To construe ‘wound’ to include fistulae and
‘pus pockets’ would thus expand the scope of the claims far beyond anything
described in the specification.”205 This argument has nothing to do with
linguistic context. It is a pure policy argument that it is unwise to allow
patentees to cover more than what they invented and described in the
specification. Again, the true driver of ex post dispute and ex ante uncertainty
is not a lack of linguistic clarity in patent claims.
4. The Demise of the Construction-to-Save-Validity Doctrine
Finally, it is worth noting that the interpretation-construction distinction
explains both the existence of, and the demise of, the doctrine that claims
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This represents a partial change in view for one of us. See Chiang, supra note 119, at 1125
(arguing that the word “wound” meant all injuries).
The prosecution history, although not physically attached to the claims in the manner of the
specification, can also provide relevant linguistic context in some circumstances. See, e.g.,
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that a
patentee specifically deleted the words “pressure jacket” from many of its claims during
prosecution and that this suggested that the resulting claims did not necessarily include a
pressure jacket).
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted).
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should be construed narrowly to save their validity.206 This doctrine says that a
claim that is drafted more broadly than is legally allowable will be construed to
conform to the legally allowable limit. As the Federal Circuit observed in
Phillips, this doctrine is almost never openly invoked today.207
As an initial matter, it is useful to see that the interpretation-construction
distinction is indispensable to comprehending the doctrine. For this doctrine to
ever be invoked, there must first be a conceptual two-step: a court must first
interpret the claim broadly according to its linguistic meaning, and then construe
it narrowly to save its validity. If it instead says that the claim meaning
automatically equals the invention, then the construction-to-save-validity
doctrine is a conceptual impossibility: the claim will always cover the invention
and there will never be anything to “save.”
And this understanding also allows us to see why the construction-to-savevalidity doctrine is almost never openly invoked by courts today: it is
superfluous. A textualist judge will not want this doctrine because it construes
claims to depart from the linguistic meaning; an anti-textualist judge does not
need this doctrine because he can use “normal” claim analysis principles to
match the claim scope to the real invention. Moreover, invoking the
construction-to-save-validity doctrine is politically costly for the court precisely
because it requires the interpretation-construction two-step to be made
expressly, which requires the court to explicitly say that the executive branch
(the PTO) erred in issuing an overbroad claim that the court must then “save”
by construction. The direct method allows the court to camouflage its policy
role, and its conflict with executive branch decisions, by saying that the
patentee’s claim “meant” the narrower meaning all along.
The same insight applies to explain the demise of the “reverse doctrine of
equivalents.” This doctrine allows a court to explicitly hold an accused device to
be encompassed by the language of a claim yet non-infringing because it falls
outside of the patentee’s invention.208 The doctrine is practically dead,209 but
remains a favorite of law professors.210

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Turrill v. Mich. S. &c. R.R. Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 491, 510 (1863). Structurally, this idea is
similar to the avoidance canon in statutory construction.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed Cir. 2005) (en banc) (stating that the
doctrine has not been applied broadly).
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950) (describing
the reverse doctrine of equivalents).
Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]his court has
never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”).
See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 895 (“The Federal Circuit’s effective abrogation
of the reverse doctrine of equivalents remains intensely controversial . . . .”); Burk & Lemley,
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Our analysis explains why the reverse doctrine of equivalents finds no favor
among judges. Like the construction-to-save-validity doctrine, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents requires judges to explicitly recognize that the language
of a claim is broader than the real invention. This is politically costly for
judges. There is no motivation for a judge to incur this political cost when the
same policy outcome can be achieved by saying that the claim “meant” the
narrow scope all along. Once again, without the interpretation-construction
distinction, judicial decision-making is less transparent and judicial policy
choices are obscured. Not only do scholars end up on a wild goose chase, many
do not even realize that they are chasing geese.
Ultimately, we think that, if a court believes that a particular claim’s
linguistic meaning is overbroad (compared to some conception of the real
invention), it would be better and more transparent for that court to either
invalidate the claim outright or at least explicitly invoke the construction-tosave-validity doctrine or the reverse doctrine of equivalents, rather than
surreptitiously achieving the narrowing result by saying that the claim “meant”
the narrower scope all along. It is naïve, however, to merely advocate for
greater transparency without appreciating the judicial incentives against it, and
we have no good solutions for overcoming those judicial incentives. Our
primary contribution is rather to provide a conceptual tool that allows other
participants in the patent system to more clearly see when judges are in fact
engaged in surreptitious atextual construction, which over the long term can
reduce the payoffs of non-transparency and thus make greater formal
transparency a more likely result.
D. Disputes over Gap-Filling Construction
Although we think that normative judicial disagreement about whether to
follow claim text is the primary cause of claim analysis disputes, we do not
wish to portray this as the only issue in claim analysis. Sometimes—though we
think less often than the literature portrays it—claim analysis disputes arise
because the claim language is ambiguous or vague. As we will explain in this
Section, however, even some such disputes are disputes over construction.

supra note 1, at 1773; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
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1. The Problem of Vagueness
The primary example of a situation where there is genuine linguistic
uncertainty, but the issue is of construction and not of interpretation, is the
situation of vagueness. In the conventional literature, it is common to say that
claims are too “vague,” that such vagueness causes uncertainty in patent rights,
and that courts need to do a better job at “interpretation” to reduce the
uncertainty.211 Such phrasing—which at bottom is a restatement of the
linguistic indeterminacy thesis—reflects fundamental conceptual errors and
causes serious analytical mistakes. Properly understood, a problem of
vagueness cannot be resolved using interpretation, and attempts to do so result
in incoherent decisions.
Consider, for example, Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Technologies, Inc.,212 which
involved a claim to a voltage regulator placed “near” a device that was being
powered. The term “near” is vague—it naturally raises the question of how
near is near enough—and this was the issue in dispute. As an intrinsic matter,
this dispute could not have been resolved using interpretation: no amount of
linguistic knowledge will tell us the precise line between “near” and “not near.”
The Federal Circuit, however, tried anyway. It purported to issue an
interpretation stating that “the term ‘near’ means close to or at the load [i.e., the
device being powered].”213
As an interpretation of language, there is nothing inaccurate about what the
Federal Circuit said. But its “interpretation” didn’t engage with the actual issue
in dispute: how close is close enough? On that question, all the Federal Circuit
did was say that “[a] skilled artisan in distributed power systems would know
where to place the regulator” such that “low voltage/high currents will not be
delivered over relatively long distances.”214 In short, on the actual issue in
dispute, the Federal Circuit did nothing except replace one term (“near”) with
another term (“close to”) with the exact same linguistic meaning,215 and
essentially kicked the can to a swearing match among expert witnesses that will

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-62.
599 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1349.
Id. (emphasis added).
This phenomenon has not escaped notice, but the authors who have discussed it tend to
over-generalize the scope of the phenomenon. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1797-98
(“[C]laim constructions are unlikely to help a judge or jury understand the patent claim
because they take simple English words and replace them with more simple English
words.”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40 (arguing that current claim analysis is broadly a
“meaningless exercise” that “replaces [words] with more words”).
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be adjudicated by a jury. By conceptualizing vagueness as a problem of
interpretation, the final result is to abandon reasoned claim analysis in favor of
a black-box jury decision on the substantive issue.
Much of the problem with the present conceptualization is that it does not
distinguish between vagueness and ambiguity, and instead uses “vagueness” as
a label for all linguistic uncertainty (or, even worse, as a label for legal
uncertainty).216 As we have explained above, in the philosophy of language,
“vagueness” refers not to all types of linguistic underdeterminacy, but to the
specific situation of a word or phrase having fuzzy boundaries (e.g., words
such as “near” or “approximately”217). This is different from “ambiguity,”
which refers to situations where words have more than one sense.218 Conflating
the two types of linguistic defects is a conceptual mistake and leads to using the
wrong analytical tools: although linguistic tools can generally resolve problems
of apparent ambiguity, they simply cannot resolve problems of vagueness.
When a particular claim term is vague and the dispute falls within the resulting
construction zone, courts must look beyond the claim language to construct a
precise line to resolve the dispute.
We should note that this second condition (that the dispute falls within the
construction zone) is quite important, and many cases that at first blush look
like disputes about vagueness are in fact not. For example, in Marine Polymer,
the linguistic meaning of “biocompatible” is a material of low reactivity.219 This
is vague, because there is a reasonable question of how “low” is low enough.
But Judge Lourie’s proposed line—that only a material of absolutely zero
detectable reactivity is biocompatible—is outside of the realm of reasonable
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See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-62 (using “vagueness” and “ambiguity”
interchangeably). The literature also tends to conflate vagueness and generality. See, e.g., id.
at 198-200 (arguing that software patent claims are particularly vague because software is
abstract); Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 103, 120 (2008) (conflating abstraction and vagueness); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Applera Corp., 605 F.3d 1347, 1348 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Plager, J., dissenting from denial of
panel rehearing) (arguing that broad claims are “inherently ambiguous”). This is erroneous.
It is true that general language is often uncertain in its legal effect—courts are more likely to
engage in atextual construction when the claim is textually very broad—but legal
uncertainty is not the same as linguistic uncertainty, and, moreover, not all linguistic
uncertainty is caused by vagueness. To take the extreme example, there is nothing vague
about a claim to “everything.”
See, e.g., Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“near”); Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 671, 682-83 (D. Del.
2010) (“approximately”).
See supra Subsection II.B.2.
Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(opinion of Dyk, J.).
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debate, because the patent’s language specifically contemplates biocompatible
materials with an elution test score of one (which indicates some detectable
reactivity).220 Thus, although the word “biocompatible” is vague, this
vagueness is not what is causing the dispute. Judge Lourie’s proposed
construction goes outside the zone where language underspecifies—it is like
construing a directive to “drive slowly” to require drivers to completely stop.
Rather than a good faith disagreement about how to draw lines in the face of
vague language, Marine Polymer is really a dispute about whether to follow the
language at all. The vagueness of the language—if one ever got that far—was a
happenstance that had no relevance to the actual dispute.
With the qualifications that not every vague claim causes litigation and
uncertainty, and that many broad or apparently ambiguous claims are not
vague at all, it remains true that vague claims do exist and do cause
uncertainty. But this is not a major part of our analysis, for two reasons. First,
there does not appear to be systematic disagreement in the same way as there is
in the specification-first versus dictionary-first methodological dispute; rather,
the construction of lines to resolve vagueness appears to have no systematic
formula or theory of construction.221 Thus, there is variance and uncertainty,
but no one has said anything useful about it because it is an ad hoc, claim-byclaim form of random uncertainty. Second, our main practical point in this
Article is that the uncertainty problem is not amenable to the linguistic
solutions that have been the focus of the existing literature. The presence of
vagueness in patent claims reinforces rather than undermines this point
because the problem of constructing lines for applying vague concepts is not
amenable to linguistic solutions.
2. The Problem of Deliberate Ambiguity
One problem often noted by the conventional literature, for which
interpretative solutions are advocated, is the problem of deliberate
ambiguity.222 In order to understand this problem, it must first be noted that
patentees have an inbuilt incentive to be disingenuous: to portray the claim
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See supra text accompanying note 175.
See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he word
‘about’ does not have a universal meaning in patent claims, and . . . the meaning depends on
the technological facts of the particular case.”); Young, 492 F.3d at 1346 (refusing to quantify
“near”).
See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(speculating that the patentee may have made “a conscious attempt to create ambiguity
about the scope of the claims”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 56-57.
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narrowly to the PTO examiner (to persuade the examiner to issue the patent)
while portraying the same claim broadly to competitors (to deter
competition).223 Patentees accordingly have an incentive to write claim
language in an ambiguous manner in order to facilitate this kind of two-faced
argument. The literature often argues that such intentional ambiguity is
pervasive and causes significant uncertainty in claim analysis.224
We acknowledge that intentional patentee ambiguity is a real concern, but
two further points are important. First, we think the problem of intentional
ambiguity in claim language is less serious than the literature has portrayed it
to be.225 Second, to the extent that the problem occurs, it cannot be solved by
better linguistic tools but requires a policy solution.
Let us first provide a concrete example of what deliberate ambiguity is and
how it can occur. In Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,226 the
patentee (Plant Genetics) invented a new type of plant seed that was resistant
to herbicide. Specifically, Plant Genetics created the new type of seed by
infecting it with bacterium and then regenerating it.227
Importantly, at the time that it filed the patent, Plant Genetics could only
get its infect-and-regenerate technique to work on one type of plant, known as
“dicots.” It could not successfully regenerate another type of plant, known as
“monocots.”228 Despite this, Plant Genetics initially filed a claim that explicitly
covered all herbicide-resistant plant seeds. The PTO examiner rejected the
broad claim, on the reasoning that Plant Genetics had not taught how to make
herbicide-resistant monocots and therefore was not entitled to a patent
covering herbicide-resistant monocots.229 It was only entitled to dicots.
Faced with this rejection, Plant Genetics then amended the claim to state
that the seed had to be “susceptible to infection and transformation by
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BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57. This strategy is related to the notion of “acoustic
separation.” See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57; Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1752-53; Seymore,
supra note 2, at 637-38.
A distinction should be drawn between patentees intentionally using ambiguous language to
make a two-faced argument, and patentees invoking ambiguous case law to do so. To the
extent that a two-faced argument is based simply on conflicting case law, then interpretative
solutions will obviously not work.
315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
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Agrobacterium and capable of regeneration thereafter.”230 The examiner clearly
understood this new language to limit the claim to dicots. He accordingly
granted the patent.231
However, a careful reader will note that the amended claim does not
literally say “dicots.” It literally covers any plant that can be infected and
regenerated—the trick is that, at the time, the only plants that could be infected
and regenerated were dicots. What later happened was that the accused
infringer (DeKalb) managed to infect and regenerate monocots and thereby
produce the same herbicide resistance.232 Plant Genetics then sued DeKalb for
infringement, on the theory that DeKalb’s accused product (a monocot) was
literally “susceptible to infection and transformation by Agrobacterium and
capable of regeneration thereafter.”
Plant Genetics therefore shows that deliberate ambiguity can occur and is a
real concern. But we think Plant Genetics also illustrates why the problem is less
serious at a systemic level than the conventional literature has presented it.
Although Plant Genetics provides an example of a patentee who succeeded in
convincing the examiner to view the claim language differently from its
common meaning, we think it also illustrates the intrinsic difficulty of the task:
it takes a rather gullible or inattentive examiner to miss the patentee’s sleightof-hand.233 A more sophisticated examiner might well have questioned why
Plant Genetics chose to write such convoluted language (“susceptible to
infection and transformation by Agrobacterium and capable of regeneration
thereafter”) rather than simply write “dicot”; and if the examiner had insisted
on explicitly using the word “dicot” in the amended claim, there would have
been no dispute later.
In other words, although the conventional literature convinces us that
patentees are acting deliberately, it has not convinced us that they regularly
succeed in creating deliberate ambiguities.234 For there to be a true ambiguity in
the language, the patentee must do more than simply hope or intend different
members of the audience to understand the claim in contradictory ways; he
must actually create two different understandings (i.e., he must bamboozle the
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Id. at 1338.
See id. at 1345 (“We conclude that the plant and seed claims were only allowed because the
limitation on transformation and regeneration was added.”).
Id. at 1338.
PTO examiners are instructed to adopt a “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard
when approaching claim language, in order to guard against patentee tricks. In re
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 112-116 (explaining that patentee intent alone does not
control the linguistic meaning).
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PTO examiner into seeing the claim language differently than other people in
the art). The conventional literature has not demonstrated empirically that
patentees regularly succeed in bamboozling PTO examiners and competitors to
come to different linguistic understandings;235 it has only pointed to the
patentee motivation to attempt such tricks.236 While we are open to being
convinced that deliberate ambiguity is a pervasive problem, the commonly
cited evidence of patentee motivation is not enough to prove this assertion.237
3. The Problem of Irreducible Ambiguity
The problem of deliberate ambiguity that we discussed in the previous
subsection can be conceptualized as part of a broader category—problems of
irreducible ambiguity. Although most instances of ambiguity in text are only
apparent (i.e., there is in fact a single correct meaning to the text when viewed
in context, but without sufficient context the single meaning is difficult to
discern), there are situations where the ambiguity is genuine and irreducible.
Plant Genetics provides an example of such a situation: where the patentee
succeeds in conveying two distinct meanings to different portions of the
intended audience (a narrow meaning to the examiner and a broad meaning to
competitors), the text has multiple meanings, and no amount of interpretation
can overcome this problem. The dispute requires construction to resolve.
Although genuine ambiguity is perhaps more likely to happen when a
patentee intentionally seeks to create the result, patentee mal-intent is not an
absolute condition for the phenomenon. Irreducible ambiguity occurs
whenever the communicative content or linguistic meaning includes multiple
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Compare BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57 (asserting that “the Patent Office does a poor
job of monitoring the clarity of patent claims”), with Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is
the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 201 (2008) (“The PTO is doing a better
job than many people think.”).
See supra text accompanying note 224. It is worth adding that the patentee motivation exists
only in a limited range of circumstances. A patentee has the incentive to use ambiguous
claim language (instead of clear and broad language) only if he fears PTO rejection. But if
the PTO is highly incompetent (as the proponents of the deliberate ambiguity theory
generally argue), then rejection is not a serious concern, and patentees thus would not
attempt deliberate ambiguity. Conversely, if the PTO is highly competent, then a deliberate
ambiguity strategy cannot succeed. Only in a Goldilocks range where the PTO is competent
enough for patentees to fear rejection, but not competent enough to actually detect patentee
chicanery, will deliberate ambiguity be a problem.
An additional point is that, even if someone were to empirically prove that PTO examiners
are regularly deceived by patentee tricks, the obvious solution would be to hire better PTO
examiners. It is not obvious that a more drastic solution (such as abolishing claims) is
warranted if the problem is deliberate ambiguity.
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senses that cannot be eliminated by resort to context. A possible example of
this phenomenon, we think, is Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America
LLC,238 which involved a claim to actuators that are “attached” to a game pad
(and which cause the game pad to vibrate when playing computer games). The
question was whether “attached” referred only to attachments to the exterior of
the game pad, or included attachments both inside and outside the game pad.
This mattered because, in the accused device, the actuator was embedded
within the game pad itself.239
As an initial matter, let us clarify that this is not a problem of vagueness but
of ambiguity: the issue here is not of blurred boundaries (no one is really
asking how closely attached is close enough) but of two distinct senses of
“attached” that denote two different concepts at different levels of generality.
In normal speech, people sometimes use the word “attached” broadly to denote
affixing both within or without—for example, what we call an “attachment” to
an email is part of the email itself. At other times, however, people use
“attached” narrowly to denote an affixation that is external to the object—it
would be regarded as quite odd, for example, to say that a person’s bones are
“attached” to his body. As a matter of ordinary usage, both senses are possible,
though we would say that the latter sense is more common.
Looking at the context of the patent document does not clarify this
ambiguity, because different passages of the specification point in different
directions. One passage of the specification stated: “a vibratory actuator can be
attached to [the] outer side of the throttle handle.”240 Although at first blush
this might be taken to favor reading “attached” to refer only to exterior
attachments (especially if one conflates linguistic meaning with the invention),
it actually has the opposite effect. The sentence says that an actuator can be—
and thus by negative implication does not have to be—attached to the outer
surface.241
However, other passages of the specification raise the opposite linguistic
inference. For example, the patent specification states that “actuators may be
attached to pre-existing rudder pedal units, or may be embedded within the
plastic or metal structure that comprises the rudder pedals during their
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669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1367 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1368 (“If the applicant had redefined the term ‘attached’ to mean only ‘attached to an
outer surface,’ then it would have been unnecessary to specify that the attachment was ‘to
[an] outer surface’ in the specification.” (alteration in original)).
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manufacture.”242 In a mirror reversal of the first passage, at first blush this
second passage might be taken to favor reading the claim to cover both exterior
attachments and embedded actuators (because the passage seems to foresee
embedded actuators as part of the invention). But, as a linguistic matter, this
passage is distinguishing between things that are “attached” to the exterior of a
game pad and things that are “embedded” within the interior—it uses
“attached” to refer only to the former situation and thus implicitly counterdistinguishes it from the latter. The correct linguistic inference from this
second passage is therefore that “attached” means only exterior attachments.
In our view, Thorner is a genuinely hard case as a matter of interpretation,
and reasonable linguistic arguments can be made on both sides. It is even
possible to conclude that, ultimately, the patentee was so self-contradictory and
confused when using the word “attached” that a skilled artisan reading the
patent would have no idea which sense is the correct one.243 To the extent this
is the case, Thorner is an illustration of our point that irreducible ambiguity can
occur, and require construction to resolve, even without any intentional
misconduct on the part of the patentee.
We hasten to add, however, that we do not think that cases of irreducible
ambiguity (either intentional or innocent) are very common. Not every
situation where language might appear somewhat self-contradictory is a case of
irreducible ambiguity; often the balance of linguistic clues will favor one
interpretation over the other. For example, in Subsection II.C.3, we explained
how we thought the court in Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc.244 was
correct to interpret “animal” in the particular patent to include humans,
because the patentee had an explicit clause that specified the definition of
“animal” to include all members of the kingdom of Animalia. We thought the
explicit clause outweighed the fact that the broad definition of “animal” caused
some of the remaining language in the patent specification to become quite
odd, such as where the patentee discussed “raising animals” by feeding them,
which is not usually language that one would use in discussing humans.245
Some amount of internal tension is common in language, and that mere fact
does not render text hopelessly indeterminate. Even with Thorner, we are not
fully convinced that the word “attached” was irreducibly ambiguous. We have
a slight preference for an interpretation of “attached” to mean only external
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U.S. Patent No. 6,422,941 col. 33 ll. 14-17 (filed Sept. 23, 1997) (emphasis added).
In real life, we can never be certain that a particular ambiguity is irresolvable, because it is
always possible that more context will reveal a single correct meaning.
579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
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attachments, because we believe that is the more common usage of the word in
ordinary language and we think that the negative inference created by the “can
be” clause is not strong (it is possible to read the clause as alternatively saying
that no vibratory actuator is needed at all). In our view, therefore, the balance
of linguistic clues in Thorner leans slightly in favor of the “external attachment
only” interpretation.246
v. why disputes are not about linguistic meaning
In the prior Part, we discussed our theory of why claim analysis disputes
are primarily over construction. Judges primarily disagree about two things:
(1) what the invention is, and (2) if the invention is different from the
linguistic meaning of the claim, which one wins? These are essential policy
judgments that are not objective or factual.
In contrast, much of the claim construction literature diagnoses the
problem as the linguistic meaning of claim text being unclear. In this Part, we
provide some rebuttal to these arguments. In the main, our argument will be
threefold: First, the leading cases on claim analysis do not involve ambiguous
claim terms. Second, the high rate of reversal by the Federal Circuit does not
prove linguistic ambiguity. Third, to the extent the existing literature has
articulated a clear theory of why claim text is expected to be ambiguous—
beyond citing high reversal rates—those articulated theories are not plausible.
A. Our Existing Interpretative Tools Are Adequate
Our first point of note is that, of the important cases involving claim
analysis, none involved any significant linguistic ambiguity. We will consider
the three most prominent claim analysis cases, namely Phillips, Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Technologies, Inc.,247 and Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.248
We start again with Phillips. As already discussed in detail, the claim term
in Phillips—“baffle”—was not linguistically ambiguous. The dispute was
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The court disagreed with our analysis and held that the “plain meaning of the term
‘attached’ encompasses either an external or internal attachment.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367.
Although we find the court’s ultimate decision to be reasonable, we also think its
characterization of the meaning as “plain” was an overstatement.
138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Markman II), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
(Markman III).
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entirely about whether the invention might have been required to deflect bullets
and whether the invention or the linguistic meaning should govern.249
The same is true of Cybor. The patent in Cybor concerned a dispenser for
industrial liquids, which contained at least two “pumping means” (the term in
dispute).250 There is no realistic ambiguity in the term “pumping means,” at
least in so far as it clearly covered a pump, which was the accused product.251
The problem was that the patentee had (arguably) represented to the PTO that
the invention was something that could not draw from an external reservoir,
which the accused pump did.252 A dispute about whether the patentee had
misled the PTO, or whether the inventive idea requires an external reservoir, is
not a dispute about the semantic definition of “pumping means.”
Third, the dispute in Markman concerned a patent for a system for
managing dry cleaning. The claim recited a system for keeping track of the
“inventory” of a dry cleaning store. The dispute concerned whether
“inventory” meant the number of articles of clothing, or the dollar value of the
clothing.253 The defendant’s accused device only kept track of the dollar value
of clothing, so it infringed under one reading and not the other.254
This claim analysis issue concededly represents a problem of interpretation,
and not of construction. The word “inventory” was ambiguous: either reading
is plausible if the word is taken by itself. To accountants, “inventory” generally
means keeping track of cash value, while to a warehouse foreman it generally
means keeping track of physical objects. Markman thus demonstrates that
claim terms can be ambiguous.
But as much as Markman demonstrates that linguistic ambiguities can
occur, resolving the ambiguity at issue was not very hard, and existing
linguistic tools were quite sufficient for the job. A simple reading of the patent
specification revealed that it talked a lot about articles of clothing but not about
keeping track of cash totals,255 making it very likely that the word “inventory”
referred to physical objects, and not cash values.256 Every judge who considered
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See supra Section III.B.
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451.
Id. at 1452-53.
Id. at 1456-57.
Markman II, 52 F.3d at 974-75 (noting that the substantive question turns on “whether the
term ‘inventory’ requires as part of its meaning ‘articles of clothing’”).
Id. at 973.
U.S. Patent No. Re. 33,054 (filed Aug. 28, 1987).
It is important to distinguish our usage of the specification from that of the anti-textualists.
We are making an inference based on ordinary English usage conventions, not based on the
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the question agreed with this interpretation.257 The only dispute in the case was
over the procedural question of who decides: namely, whether disputes over
claim analysis should be adjudicated by judges or juries.258 Once that
procedural question was decided (the Supreme Court held that judges should
perform claim analysis), the correct interpretation of “inventory” was treated
largely as an afterthought.259 Because the interpretative issue was simple and
unanimously resolved using existing interpretative tools, Markman does not
provide strong support for the linguistic indeterminacy thesis. In fact, it
undermines it.
To be sure, we have not done a systematic study of all litigated cases—such
a study is not practically feasible. As such, there is always the possibility that
the supposedly “canonical” cases that we have analyzed are not in fact
representative of the broader claim analysis debate; and a reader can likely
point to counter-examples of cases260 where an ambiguity is both (a) difficult
to resolve and (b) the genuine cause of disagreement.261 But we do think our
sample is sufficiently suggestive to cast significant doubt on the view that
linguistic ambiguity in patent claims is pervasive and causes an epidemic of
claim analysis disputes, especially because the canonical cases presumably
reflect the courts’ own judgments of what constitute representative cases.

257.

258.
259.
260.
261.

patentee’s inventive contribution. As a matter of common experience, any document that
talks a lot about physical objects, and spends no time talking about cash totals, probably
uses “inventory” in the sense of physical objects. In this manner, the general subject matter
of the patent (sometimes known as “the invention”) can sometimes provide relevant
linguistic context. But this is very different from an argument that “inventory” must mean
articles of clothing because the patentee only conceived a system to keep track of physical
articles and thus is not legally entitled to claim more, which is what anti-textualists usually
mean when they argue for interpreting claims according to the “invention.” See Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853) (holding that claims should be interpreted according to
what the patentee has a “just right” to cover).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Markman
I) (“Inventory means articles of clothing, not just dollars.”); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 982
(holding the same); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring) (arguing for
deference to juries); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 998 (Rader, J., concurring) (agreeing that “cash
transaction totals are not ‘inventory’”); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 1026 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for a jury determination); Markman III, 517 U.S. at 391 (affirming
Federal Circuit).
Markman III, 517 U.S. at 372 (“The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called
patent claim . . . is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court.”).
Id. at 391 (affirming the judgment without considering the interpretative dispute).
See, e.g., supra Subsection IV.D.3 (discussing Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669
F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
We should note that these are separate conditions. Our argument does not require
interpretation to be easy, it merely requires interpretation to not be the real issue in dispute.
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B. Reversal Rates Do Not Prove Linguistic Ambiguity
More than anything else, the existing literature has relied on the high rate
at which the Federal Circuit reverses in claim analysis cases as ipso facto proof
that claims are linguistically ambiguous.262 This is wrong.
As an initial matter, relying on reversal rates as a measure of uncertainty
has a well-known selection problem: the most uncertain cases are the most
likely to end up in litigation.263 But our contention is more fundamental and
does not depend on the selection effect. The existing literature is wrong to infer
linguistic uncertainty from reversal rates because reversal rates speak only to
legal uncertainty and not linguistic uncertainty. The fact that judges disagree
about legal outcomes does not prove that the uncertainty has linguistic roots.
Legal uncertainty in claim analysis can arise either because (1) judges are all
faithful textualists but the linguistic meaning is ambiguous, or (2) some judges
are not faithful textualists and therefore don’t follow the linguistic meaning.
What the existing literature explicitly or implicitly assumes is some version of
(1). What we have shown in Part IV is that this is simply not the case. The
existing uncertainty in patent law—and the high reversal rate—occurs not
because judges are all textualists but disagree over the correct linguistic
meaning, but because some judges are not textualists and don’t follow the
linguistic meaning. When a textualist district judge meets an anti-textualist
appellate panel (or vice versa), a reversal can occur without any linguistic
ambiguity whatsoever.

262.

263.

598

See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 116-17 (arguing that the reversal rate indicates that “plain
meaning is not so plain”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1744-45 (arguing that the
prospect of reversal makes claim construction inherently uncertain); Chen, supra note 48, at
1178-80 (arguing that judicial disagreement proves “as a matter of logic” that patent claims
are . . . characterized by multiple reasonable interpretations rather than a single true
meaning”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 37 (arguing that “[c]laim interpretation is just not a
uniform process”); Menell et al., supra note 1, at 715-16 (citing the high reversal rate for
claim construction rulings); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2001) (arguing for expedited appeal for patent
claims given the rate of reversal).
Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 985 (2010). See generally George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)
(describing selection effects).
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C. Theories of Linguistic Ambiguity Are Not Plausible
Beyond the fallacious assertion that high reversal rates prove linguistic
ambiguity, scholars have articulated three more detailed theories of why claims
would be linguistically ambiguous. In the Subsections below, we will address
each of these theories.
1. The Scientific Jargon Theory
The most frequently given reason for why patent claims are expected to be
linguistically uncertain is that patent claims involve highly technical
language,264 which supposedly can only be understood by a person of skill in
the art.265 In many ways, this is identical to saying that the language is
uncertain because it is unfamiliar—text written in scientific jargon is often
compared to a foreign language like Greek. And we concede the possibility that
this is a cause of uncertainty. Yet for three reasons we are skeptical that this is a
major explanation.
The first reason is that judges seem to have the same vehement claim
analysis disputes even about the simplest non-scientific terms. As Dan Burk
and Mark Lemley note, there are disagreements about terms such as “‘a,’ ‘or,’
‘to,’ ‘including,’ and ‘through.’”266 This suggests that some reason for
disagreement that equally applies to simple terms—e.g., policy fights about the
invention—is more responsible for the uncertainty.
The second reason—a mirror point of the first—is that disputes over
complex terms don’t seem to happen very often. In the highest “ranked” claim
analysis cases (i.e., those decided by the Supreme Court or the en banc Federal
Circuit), the disputed terms were respectively “manufacture,”267 “inventory,”268
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See, e.g., Lee, supra note 180, at 29-30 (arguing that patent claim interpretation is
“cognitively demanding”); Moore, supra note 262, at 3-4 (questioning judges’ ability to
determine the meaning of highly technical patent terms); Rai, supra note 49, at 881-82
(noting that “the typical judge is unlikely to be a person skilled in the relevant art”); John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1413, 1475 (2003) (arguing that patent cases require “technological decisions”).
Nard, supra note 1, at 6 (“[P]atents are written by and for persons having ordinary skill in
the art.”). The scientific jargon theory should be distinguished from another kind of
argument, which is that claims are written in legally complex language. See Fromer, supra
note 117, at 560 (noting that those “trained in the relevant art” often find legal jargon
incomprehensible). Legally complex language is familiar to judges.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1744 (collecting citations).
Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570-74 (1876).
Markman III, 517 U.S. at 375.
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“pumping means,”269 “baffle,”270 and “biocompatible.”271 Of these, only
“biocompatible” can be plausibly characterized as scientific jargon—and
nobody in Marine Polymer suggested that there was a specialized definition of
“biocompatible” that was known to scientists but not lay judges.272 In sum,
courts can have vehement fights about non-scientific terms, and they seem to
be fighting primarily about non-scientific terms. Although these canonical
cases might be unrepresentative of the broader population of litigated patent
cases, we do think this sample is sufficiently suggestive to cast doubt on the
scientific jargon theory, and we are not aware of any contrary empirical study
that shows disputes over scientific terms to be common. The only article that
systematically considers the question reaches the same conclusion that we
do.273
Our third reason for skepticism towards the scientific jargon theory is that
judges already have enormous resources at their disposal to educate themselves
about scientific terms. Quite obviously, judges have paid experts and the best
technical dictionaries that the parties’ money can buy. Even if we are concerned
that paid experts might be biased, district courts can (and do) appoint technical
advisors for themselves,274 or alternatively can delegate claim analysis disputes
to technically trained special masters to decide.275 Yet none of these tools seem
to have any perceptible effect on the claim uncertainty problem, as evidenced
by the ever-increasing number of articles and judicial cases complaining about
the problem and suggesting new solutions.276 If a sick patient has received
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Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456-60 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
See id. at 1358 (opinion of Lourie, J.) (“[T]he district court did not find that ‘biocompatible’
had a plain and ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art.”); id. at 1367 (opinion of Dyk, J.)
(arguing only that “the specification defines ‘biocompatible’”). As we explained in
Subsection IV.B.3, the real cause of dispute in Marine Polymer was a policy disagreement.
Osenga, supra note 3, at 90 & n.151 (“Most of the terms the court construes are not technical
terms.”).
Nard, supra note 1, at 66 & n.273; see also TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360,
1377-81 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (approving the use of a technical advisor for claim construction).
See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, A Study of the Role and Impact of Special Masters in
Patent Cases, FED. JUD. CENTER (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup
/specmapa.pdf/$file/specmapa.pdf.
See supra notes 1-9. In a recent article, Jonas Anderson and Peter Menell find that the
reversal rate has declined after Phillips, Anderson & Menell, supra note 48, but they attribute
this to the Federal Circuit giving “informal deference” to district courts rather than to judges
actually getting better at claim analysis. In another empirical study, Polk Wagner and Lee
Petherbridge find that “the Phillips opinion . . . has utterly failed in advancing the Federal
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numerous treatments based on a diagnosis, with no perceptible benefit, a good
doctor should probably rethink the initial diagnosis. Our argument is the same
regarding the scientific jargon diagnosis for claim uncertainty.
2. The Evolving Language Theory
The second theory of why claims are ambiguous, articulated by Mark
Lemley, is that language evolves and thus old terms become hard to
understand. According to Lemley:
[T]he meaning of particular terms . . . will frequently change over time.
Indeed, the risk of change in the meaning of terms over time is
particularly great in patent law, because patents necessarily involve new
ideas, and the process of assigning terms to describe those new ideas is
not static.277
The problem with this evolving language theory of linguistic uncertainty is
that such evolution almost never happens in the twenty-year duration of a
patent,278 if we have a proper understanding of what constitutes linguistic
evolution. In our definition, the linguistic meaning of a word changes—and
thus becomes potentially uncertain—if the word comes to be used in a different
sense or becomes archaic and falls out of common knowledge. A good example
is the phrase “domestic violence,” which appears in Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution. In 1789, the term primarily meant riots and insurrections. Today,
the phrase primarily refers to spousal abuse. A modern reader must therefore
engage in some interpretative heavy-lifting to avoid getting the wrong
linguistic meaning. That is, the interpreter must cast aside the modern
understanding of “domestic violence” and see it in the archaic riots-andinsurrections sense of the phrase because that is what the original audience
would have understood. This phenomenon is sometimes called “linguistic
drift,” and it usually takes decades or centuries to occur.279

277.
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Circuit’s management of claim construction doctrine and has most likely made it worse.” R.
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 123, 146.
Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102
(2005).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
See EDWARD SAPIR, LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SPEECH 165-66 (1921);
SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING (2008).
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This is not the kind of linguistic evolution that Lemley has in mind.
Rather, Lemley is arguing that the set of real-world objects that are covered by a
particular claim expands over time. To see this, consider the leading case that
Lemley cites as a demonstration of his version of the problem: SuperGuide
Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.280
In SuperGuide, the patent related to television programming, and the claim
recited receiving television programming via “regularly received television
signals.” In 1985, when the patent was filed, all television signals were analog.
By 2004, most television signals had changed to digital. The question was
whether a “regularly received television signal” covered a modern digital signal.
The court held that it did. According to Lemley, this holding shows that the
“meaning” of “regularly received television signal” in the claim changed
between 1985 and 2004.281
But it is important to see that the linguistic meaning of “regularly received
television signal” was constant. The linguistic meaning of “regularly received
television signal” is a television signal that is usually received by users. That
was its meaning in 1985, and that was its meaning in 2004. What changed was
the set of real-world objects that fit within the description—they have changed
from analog signals to digital signals.282 This is not a change in linguistic
meaning, and it cannot be redressed by better interpretative strategy and tools.
Consider an analogy. The Constitution allows Congress to regulate
commerce among the “several States.” The linguistic meaning of “States” has
not changed between 1789 and 2013; it refers to the semi-autonomous political
subdivisions that comprise this country. But the set of real-world objects that
fit within the definition has changed—we have expanded from thirteen States
to fifty. Nobody thinks that expanding from thirteen States to fifty is a change
in the meaning of “State,” or that this causes linguistic uncertainty. Likewise,
nobody should think that the television industry changing from analog signals
to digital signals represents a change to the linguistic meaning of “regularly
received television signals,” or that it somehow illustrates linguistic ambiguity
in claim text. It does not.283
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358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Lemley, supra note 277, at 104.
See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On
Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 537 (2008)
(distinguishing between “thing-scope” and “meaning-scope”).
The distinction between “linguistic meaning” and “the set of real-world objects that fit
within the definition” is based on the sense-reference distinction in the philosophy of
language. The distinction is from Gottlob Frege. Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, 57
PHIL. REV. 209 (Max Black trans., 1948) (1892). For a discussion in the context of the
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Yet Lemley is correct in saying that cases like SuperGuide cause uncertainty
in a more general sense. Judge Michel disagreed with the majority and argued
for limiting the patentee to analog television signals. Other cases similarly
support the proposition that a patent claim may only cover the technology that
was in use at the time of a patent’s filing.284 Patentees and competitors trying
to ascertain their legal rights have difficulty doing so ahead of time.
Our point is that this uncertainty does not have linguistic roots. Judge
Michel argued in SuperGuide:
I . . . cannot extend the literal scope of the claims to systems for
receiving signal technology that was not . . . conceived of and reduced
to practice by these inventors, much less described and enabled in their
’578 patent application filed in 1985.285
In other words, Judge Michel argued that a system using digital signals was
not what the patentee invented. Once again, the disagreement is not what the
claim language means as a semantic matter, but that the majority and Judge
Michel had different theories of construction and different policy judgments
about the desirability of allowing patentees to cover subsequently developed
technology.
3. The Radical Indeterminacy Theory
The third theory of why claim language would be linguistically unclear is
not limited to patent law but is more general. It says that all text is inherently
unclear. This argument was most famously made by Chief Justice Traynor in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,286 a case that
appears in virtually every contracts casebook. The same argument receives its
canonical expression in patent law in Autogiro Co. of America v. United States287:
Claims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face. A comparison
must exist. The lucidity of a claim is determined in light of what ideas it

284.
285.
286.
287.

interpretation of legal texts, see Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional
Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1624-28
(2009).
PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 897-98 (Michel, J., concurring in the result).
442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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is trying to convey. Only by knowing the idea, can one decide how much
shadow encumbers the reality.
....
The inability of words to achieve precision is none the less extant
with patent claims than it is with statutes. The problem is likely more
acute with claims. . . . An invention exists most importantly as a tangible
structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an
afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This
conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which
cannot be satisfactorily filled.288
It is important to clearly state why this argument is wrong. As an initial
matter, we can agree with the statement that legal texts, including patent
claims, are rarely “clear and unambiguous on their face.” As we discussed above,
discerning the linguistic meaning requires evidence, and that evidence can
come from other parts of the document, such as the specification, as well as
outside the document from dictionaries and experts. Without looking at the
specification in Kinetic Concepts, one would not know that the word “wound”
in that claim in fact meant skin injuries and not injuries generally.289
But this is not what opinions like Autogiro end up saying or doing. What
Autogiro is saying is that unless one first knows “the idea” that the claim is
trying to convey, one cannot know what the claim says.290 In the next breath, it
equates “the idea” that the claim is supposedly trying to convey with the idea
that it should be conveying, i.e., the invention. What Autogiro boils down to is
saying that the claim is always ambiguous until one knows what the invention
is, and one should therefore look for the invention (in the specification and
elsewhere) in order to define the claim. This rhetorical jujitsu transforms the
test into the standard anti-textualist position.
The bottom line is that the Autogiro formulation is not showing the
linguistic ambiguity of text. It merely asserts that text is ambiguous and then
goes looking for the invention instead. It does not realize that these are
completely distinct things. And the resulting “ambiguities” it finds—such as
that the text might not cover the real invention—are not linguistic ambiguities.
They are simply reflections of the fact that the linguistic meaning of the claim
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Id. at 396-97 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 198-203.
This is already backwards, because the claim language is the best evidence of what ideas it is
trying to convey. To say that one must know the idea before one can understand language is
tantamount to saying that communication is impossible without mind-reading. But this
conceptual mistake is less important than the court’s next move.
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and the patentee’s invention are different things. Properly understood, there is
no linguistic ambiguity here. The only reason that people conclude otherwise is
because they conflate the linguistic meaning with the invention.
vi. implications
As we will explain below, we see three major payoffs to bringing the
interpretation-construction distinction to patent law. First, once we distinguish
between linguistic uncertainty and legal uncertainty, it becomes clear that
linguistic uncertainty is not what is causing disputes in patent law, at least in
the main. In Section VI.A we argue that the implication of this insight is that
better linguistic tools—which scholars and judges have devoted much effort to
developing—will not help much to resolve the uncertainty problem.
Second, as we have argued in previous Parts, the most significant source of
uncertainty in patent law today is policy disagreement among judges. We think
the interpretation-construction distinction provides a useful conceptual tool to
diagnose such policy disagreement as the cause of uncertainty and also a better
conceptual framework within which to conduct these policy debates. Some
scholars in the existing literature seem to—at least on some level—appreciate
the role of policy disagreement in causing uncertainty in claim analysis, and
accordingly make what are really policy arguments in favor of a particular claim
construction methodology (generally speaking, an anti-textualist one). Yet the
dominance of the linguistic indeterminacy thesis means that even these
scholars express their policy arguments under the guise of solutions to
linguistic indeterminacy: these scholars almost always argue that courts should
consider policy because claim language is pervasively “ambiguous.” As we will
explain in Section VI.B, we think such linguistic indeterminacy arguments are
both factually unsound and logically unnecessary. At the same time, we
reemphasize that we do not contend that language is always clear or always
resolves disputes; in Section VI.C, we explain how language can be underdeterminate and what courts should do in such situations. Our most
fundamental contribution is not to say how any specific issue should be
resolved, but to say that the interpretation-construction distinction provides a
conceptual tool to explain both the capabilities and limitations of language, and
provides a conceptual framework within which both linguistic and nonlinguistic arguments can be made cleanly.
Third, by conceptually separating factual questions of linguistic meaning
from normative questions of legal effect, the interpretation-construction
distinction provides a conceptual framework to discuss the perennial issue of
the institutional allocation of claim analysis. This question has recently been
subject to heightened attention due to the Federal Circuit’s en banc
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consideration of the issue in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Electronics
North America Corp.291 In Section VI.D we will explain how the interpretationconstruction distinction provides a better way to frame the issue, and how we
think the issue should be resolved.
A. Linguistic Tools and Claim Interpretation
Our most important claim in this Article is that, contrary to the linguistic
indeterminacy thesis, the uncertainty in patent rights is generally not caused by
ambiguity in claim language. Rather, we believe that the uncertainty problem
is largely attributable to policy disagreement among judges.292 We are not
claiming that ambiguity and vagueness never occur or cause disputes, but we
are saying that they are much rarer than the literature tends to assume. At least
in the most prominent cases at the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, the
dispute has not centered on a disagreement over what the linguistic meaning is,
nor over how to fill in gaps in the linguistic meaning, but over whether the
linguistic meaning should govern.
The implication that follows is rather pessimistic. What we have shown is
that the large body of literature that seeks to develop better linguistic tools for
interpreting claims has been fundamentally misguided. Contrary to the usual
rhetoric, the claim analysis debate is not a debate between two camps of judges
with good faith disagreements about linguistic meaning, but who still share the
linguistic meaning as a common lodestar. Rather, the claim analysis debate is
one over methodology—some judges are simply not following the linguistic
meaning.293 Better linguistic tools, to more accurately discern the linguistic
meaning, cannot resolve this fundamental methodological disagreement. To
the extent that scholars and judges have been trying to clarify linguistic
ambiguities and debating the best linguistic tools for the job (rather than
fighting a proxy war over policy under the guise of linguistics), those efforts
have been largely in vain and will continue to be unproductive.
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No. 2012-1014 (Fed. Cir. argued Sept. 13, 2013).
We should note that our fundamental claim—that better linguistic tools will not help—still
holds even if claims are pervasively vague, even though we do not believe this to be the case.
Vagueness, unlike ambiguity, cannot be solved by better interpretative tools.
See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 276, at 147 (finding a “very substantial split in
methodological approach”).
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B. Policy Arguments and Claim Construction
Lest we be misunderstood, we are not saying that no one in the existing
literature has appreciated the role of policy arguments in claim analysis
disputes. In our eyes, numerous scholarly proposals for courts to give greater
weight to the real invention in claim construction, including most prominently
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley’s proposal for courts to abolish claims altogether,
are really about policy and not linguistics.294 That is, we think the best
argument in favor of such anti-textualism in claim construction is that
following patentee-written claim text is likely to result in substantively
overbroad patent monopolies, because patentees are likely to write claims in a
self-serving manner. Having courts ignore claim text in favor of enforcing a
neutral judge’s conception of the real invention would likely result in less
biased (and narrower) patent scope, and this is arguably a better policy
outcome.295 Not only do we think this is the best argument in favor of the antitextualist approach, we think it is the real intuition that underlies antitextualist proposals.
Yet no anti-textualist scholar ever does more than briefly allude to this
argument.296 The reason for the omission is obvious: the logical conclusion of
the argument is that patent claims should be ignored even if the text is
linguistically clear. Arguing that judges should ignore clear text is considered
taboo in our culture,297 especially because the linguistic indeterminacy thesis is
so deeply entrenched in patent law (the flip side of saying that all of our
problems come from unclear text is a reflexive assumption that clear text is
inherently good). A scholar who made the argument explicitly would damage
his own credibility.
For this reason, anti-textualists typically present their argument in a
linguistic guise: they argue that courts should look for the real invention

294.
295.

296.
297.

See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2; Burk & Lemley, supra note 1; Cotropia, supra note 45; Lee, supra
note 2; Liivak, supra note 43.
Though we emphasize that this is contestable. As one of us has explained elsewhere, courts
are unlikely to have the information to determine the correct scope of a patent. Tun-Jen
Chiang, Forcing Patentee Claims (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 12-51, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130961. Having courts follow biased
claims, at least to some extent, may be better than having courts attempt blind stabs at the
optimal patent scope.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
As a telling example, Craig Allen Nard labels a claim-centered approach as
“hypertextualism” and an invention-centered approach (which he strongly favors) as
“pragmatic textualism.” Nard, supra note 1, at 4-6. He takes pains to portray his preferred
approach as still “embracing the importance of textual fidelity.” Id. at 6.
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because, when claim language is ambiguous, courts must look beyond the
text.298 This framing serves as a shield against charges that their proposals
amount to having courts ignore clear text in favor of judge-imposed policy.299
In a second step, however, anti-textualists then argue that claims are always
ambiguous,300 so the final result is that courts should always look for the real
invention.301 The upshot is that the linguistic framing achieves the same
substantive result, while giving anti-textualists two rhetorical advantages:
First, they avoid the taboo of saying that courts should ignore clear text.302
Second, they avoid having to acknowledge the normative contestability of their
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See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 32 (arguing that courts should “constru[e] patent
claims narrowly and in light of the actual invention when the claim terms are ambiguous”);
Lee, supra note 2, at 105 (“Where the Phillips methodology does not yield a clear
interpretation, I suggest that policy considerations aimed at promoting technological
progress should inform claim construction.”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40 (“In the cult’s
view, [claims] are just the exclusive rights granted by a patent. That definition gives very
few contextual clues as to the distinction between correct and incorrect interpretations.”).
Lee, supra note 2, at 113 (“[I]t bears emphasizing that under my proposal, substantive and
policy considerations only come into play when traditional claim construction does not yield
a clear answer; given the void that some interpretive gloss must fill, the charge of ‘redrafting’
claims seems inapposite.”); see also Burk, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that “[t]he text
remains central” to his approach and “it is hardly a recipe for judicial activism”); Liivak,
supra note 43, at 42 (“Claims can and do play a central role in this system.”); Nard, supra
note 1, at 10 (“This emphasis on textual internal coherence is central to pragmatic textualism
. . . .”).
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1745 & n.10 (“‘[C]laim construction may be inherently
indeterminate.’” (quoting Schwartz, supra note 1, at 259)); id. (“‘[T]he nature of language
makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application.’” (quoting
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002))); Burk &
Lemley, supra note 37, at 52 (arguing that “the words of claims” are indeterminate); Lee,
supra note 2, at 102-04, 114 (arguing that claim interpretation is “inherently difficult to
perform,” “fraught with indeterminacy,” “highly indeterminate,” and has “well-known
difficulties”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40-42 (arguing that claim text alone is
“meaningless”); see also Nard, supra note 1, at 57 (“The hypertextualist philosophy relies too
heavily on the power of the word to convey meaning with clarity.”).
Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1784-85 (suggesting that patent law should abolish claims);
Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 30 (arguing that because there is “no such thing” as a plain
meaning to claims, courts should instead “start with the patentee’s invention itself,
construing patent claims narrowly and in light of the actual invention when the claim terms
are ambiguous”).
We are not suggesting that anti-textualists consciously manipulate their argument. The
taboo against ignoring clear text is internalized into the lawyer psyche to the extent that it
often requires no conscious awareness. Our point is that, even if unconscious, the antitextualist move piggybacks on this political dynamic.
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policy prescriptions.303 Instead of defending the normative merits of their
approach, anti-textualists declare in a Borg-like manner that textualism is
hopeless, anti-textualism is inevitable, and resistance is futile.304
Although we understand the rhetorical usefulness of this move, we think it
is problematic for two reasons. First, the approach relies on a logical fallacy,
namely collapsing the interpretation-construction distinction. The standard
anti-textualist move requires endorsing the linguistic indeterminacy thesis and
portraying claim text as pervasively ambiguous, but the “ambiguities” that are
commonly cited in the literature are not linguistic but legal.305 The result, once
viewed through the lens of the interpretation-construction distinction, is a
deep irony: the uncertainty over claim construction arises because judges
disagree about whether textualism or anti-textualism is the better
methodology, and anti-textualist scholars are citing this very disagreement as
“proof” that anti-textualism is not only the better methodology but an
inevitable one.306 A better example of a self-fulfilling prophecy cannot be
found.
Second, the approach dodges the real debate. If—as we think is the case—
the real argument in favor of a look-for-the-real-invention approach is that it
results in what anti-textualists view as better policy outcomes, then this
argument should be made explicitly. Such candor is more conceptually sound
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Of course, the substantive debates at issue here—textualism versus anti-textualism, broad
patents versus narrow patents—are debates that have eluded consensus for centuries. We
understand the desire to avoid the quagmire. Our point is that these are the real debates that
underlie claim construction disputes. They cannot be avoided.
See Burk, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that anti-textualism simply “recognizes the latitude
judges have, that originalism serves to conceal”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1791
(stating that the “simple answer” to textualist objections is that textualism in patent law has
already “failed catastrophically”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 54 (“[W]here
indeterminacy exists—as it inevitably will—courts will be required to shape the appropriate
boundary . . . .” (emphasis added)).
See, e.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 116-17 (citing high reversal rate); Burk & Lemley, supra note
1, at 1744-45 (citing legal uncertainty over construction of words such as “‘a,’ ‘or,’ ‘to,’
‘including,’ and ‘through’”). See also supra Section V.B.
The anti-textualism-is-inevitable meme has another logical defect, which is that the very act
of arguing for inevitability provides evidence that the inevitability claim is false. If antitextualism were truly inevitable, then there would be no need for anyone to write articles
arguing for judges to adopt it. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the
System?, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232153 (calling this the
inside/outside fallacy); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J.
307, 329 (2008) (discussing the inside/outside fallacy as a problem of double standards for
possibility). In one passage of their article, Burk and Lemley seem to show awareness of this
problem and frame their argument as a call for transparency, Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at
1783, but their article as a whole cannot be reasonably read as so limited.
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and makes for more productive scholarship. Right now, textualists are not
being called upon to normatively defend their reliance on patentee-written
claim text because anti-textualist scholars do not overtly question it; they
instead devote most of their energy to arguing the fallacious proposition that
text cannot be followed because it is indeterminate. Our goal is to redirect the
debate away from this plainly wrong proposition to what we regard as the
real—and far more interesting—policy issue. Textualists should explicitly make
the policy case in favor of textualism (and broader patents); and antitextualists should explicitly make the policy case in favor of anti-textualism
(and narrower patents).307 The interpretation-construction distinction helps
create a climate for such candor by exposing this policy disagreement as the
real underlying debate. To the extent that we make the anti-textualist case
more politically difficult by removing the linguistic varnish from their
argument (in a political environment where judges are unlikely to accept
unvarnished anti-textualist arguments), we regard this as an incidental effect.
We do not think it undermines our claim to neutrality on the substantive
policy issue.
C. The Resolution of Vagueness
Although we think that the standard anti-textualist argument regarding the
radical indeterminacy of text—and its follow-up implication that courts not
only should, but inevitably must, look beyond text—is seriously mistaken, we
should note that there is a limited set of circumstances where it has validity.
Specifically, as we explained in Subsection IV.D.1 where a claim is vague and
the dispute falls within the construction zone, courts indeed must look beyond
the text.
The problem here is that anti-textualists over-generalize the extent of this
phenomenon, by characterizing this as a feature of all claim analysis.308 That is
not correct.
The implication of our analysis for the vagueness problem is twofold. In
situations of genuine vagueness, where disputes fall within the construction

307.

308.

610

In theory, textualism does not necessarily lead to broader patents, since a court could
construe the claim as written and then invalidate it. But, given the structural bias against
invalidity, a textualist approach to claim construction will generally result in broader patent
scope. See supra note 95.
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1797-98 (“[C]laim constructions are unlikely to help a
judge or jury understand the patent claim because they take simple English words and
replace them with more simple English words.”); Liivak, supra note 43, at 40 (arguing that
current claim analysis is generally a “meaningless exercise”).

the interpretation-construction distinction in patent law

zone, courts should recognize that claim text cannot itself provide all the
answers, and thus policy considerations will necessarily come into play. Failure
to acknowledge this fact won’t make it go away; it will only result in courts
issuing empty “interpretations” that leave the substantive decision-making to
black-box juries.309 On the other hand, one should be careful not to overstate
how frequently disputes are actually caused by vagueness. The most prominent
examples in the case law (e.g., Phillips and Markman) are not true examples of
this type of problem.310 The examples provided by anti-textualist scholars also
generally miss the mark.311 Thus, although we agree with the anti-textualists as
to the resolution of vagueness when it occurs, we think vagueness is a narrower
problem than commonly believed.
D. The Role of Institutional Allocation
A final implication of the interpretation-construction distinction is to shed
much light on the long-standing debate over institutional allocation, namely
whether claim analysis is a question of law for (appellate) judges or a question
of fact for juries. Ever since the Supreme Court in Markman held that claim
analysis should be treated as a “purely legal” issue “under the authority of the
single appeals court,”312 a cottage industry has arisen to argue that the Federal
Circuit should nonetheless treat claim analysis as a question of fact and defer to
trial courts in their findings.313 The Federal Circuit is currently considering this
issue en banc in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America
Corp.314
As an initial matter, let us say that the interpretation-construction
distinction provides support for the proponents of the argument that claim
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See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
As we explained above, even Marine Polymer, which really does involve a vague claim term
(“biocompatible”), is not an example of this problem, because the dispute did not fall within
the construction zone. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (opinion of Dyk, J.); see supra text accompanying notes 219-221.
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 37 (arguing that “screw” might encompass a nail if
the real invention encompassed nails).
Markman III, 517 U.S. at 391.
See, e.g., ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 665; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 58-61;
NARD, supra note 17, at 448-51; Anderson & Menell, supra note 48, at 22-23; Eileen M.
Herlihy, Appellate Review of Patent Claim Construction: Should the Federal Circuit Be Its Own
Lexicographer in Matters Related to the Seventh Amendment?, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 469, 489, 492-93 (2009); Rai, supra note 49, at 882.
No. 2012-1014 (Fed. Cir. argued Sept. 13, 2013).
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analysis is factual in one important respect. Properly understood, claim
interpretation is a factual question about what people in the art actually
understand the language to communicate. Markman’s holding that the entirety
of claim analysis should be treated as a “purely legal” issue creates a legal
fiction that departs from reality.315
That said, we disagree with those who argue that the Federal Circuit
should hold claim analysis to be a question of fact and give deference to district
courts, which we believe to be the overwhelming consensus of academic
opinion.316 We disagree for two reasons.
First, we do not think this course is properly open to the Federal Circuit as
a subordinate court, given what Markman very clearly held. Those who argue
for deference to district courts like to point to the passage in Markman where
the Supreme Court stated: “[T]he sounder course, when available, is to classify
a mongrel practice (like construing a term of art following receipt of evidence)
by . . . comparing the modern practice to earlier ones . . . .”317 They argue that
this shows that the Supreme Court held claim analysis to be a mongrel practice
with a factual component.318 But this is not a reasonable description of what
the Court was doing in the quoted passage. The Supreme Court was making
an observation about the intrinsic nature of the problem—how to classify what
is intrinsically a mixed practice—before choosing a doctrinal classification. The
holding is what the Court then does—whether it classifies claim analysis as legal
or factual for doctrinal purposes. In Markman the Court chose “purely legal.”
Second, as a normative matter, although we think that claim analysis really
is a mixed question, as between its two components (interpretation and
construction) we think that existing disputes are mainly over construction. The
primary source of dispute is not a factual disagreement over what the language
means, but over doctrinal methodology: should patent scope be governed by the
linguistic meaning or by the real invention? Juries and trial judges are not wellequipped to resolve this question. From the perspective of achieving long-term
resolution, we think a consensus about the proper methodology for claim
construction is far more likely to emerge from candid deliberation among
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Nard, supra note 1, at 35.
See supra note 313.
Markman III, 517 U.S. at 378.
See, e.g., ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 665; Rai, supra note 49, at 882; see also Anderson
& Menell, supra note 48, at 25 (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s de novo review standard
has improperly “diverged from the Supreme Court’s characterization of claim construction
as a ‘mongrel practice’”); Nard, supra note 1, at 23-24 (observing that “[t]his language
breathed new life into the pragmatic textualists who . . . argued that de novo review was not
the sole standard of review”).
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twelve appellate judges (or nine Supreme Court Justices) than it is to emerge
among hundreds of district court judges across the nation each following their
own individually preferred methodologies in the individual cases that come
before them. Under this system, textualist district court judges will follow the
linguistic meaning of patentee-drafted claim text while anti-textualist district
court judges will follow their subjective conception of the real invention. That,
more than anything else, is likely to perpetuate the uncertainty over patent
rights.319
conclusion
The starting point of all conventional discussion in claim analysis is the
linguistic indeterminacy thesis: the assumption that the root cause of difficulty
in analyzing patent claims is linguistic indeterminacy. Our fundamental
contribution in this Article is to show that the linguistic indeterminacy thesis is
wrong. The entire claim analysis literature has been taken off-track by this
fundamental error. Contrary to the belief that ex ante uncertainty arises
because judges disagree about the content of the linguistic meaning of a claim,
we have shown that uncertainty arises because judges disagree about whether to
follow the linguistic meaning as a matter of normative policy.
In some sense, the claim that judges decide cases according to their policy
preferences may strike cynical-minded readers as unsurprising. But the
enormous literature that treats claim analysis as a linguistic question belies any
contention that our claim is well-known. Moreover, our contribution is not
merely to make the simple-minded and cynical claim that judges act according
to their policy preferences; it is more importantly to provide a conceptual tool
to clearly expose how this occurs. By providing a conceptual tool to explain
precisely why the linguistic indeterminacy thesis errs and how it clouds the
existing debate, we provide a better foundation within which future policy
prescriptions can be made more cleanly and be evaluated on their policy merits,
rather than forcing the debate to be conducted under a misleading linguistic
gloss.
The final take-away is that the uncertainty about claim scope will persist
until judges reach normative agreement about claim analysis policy (or such
normative agreement is imposed from above, such as by Congress). We do not
have any suggestions about how to force life-tenured judges to reach policy
consensus. But understanding the nature of the problem is a predicate to
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See Lefstin, supra note 9, at 1041-42 (arguing that predictability outside of litigation is more
important than predictability after trial).
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finding a solution. Without adopting the interpretation-construction
distinction and overcoming the linguistic indeterminacy fallacy, no progress
can be made on the claim analysis problem.
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